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THE FIRST ROUND

Indo-Pakistan War 1965

AIR MARSHAL (RETD)
M. ASGHAR KHAN

Excerpt from the Introduction

This book is based on my impressions, jotted down at the time of the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, as I saw it. It is not a history of the War, nor is it meant to be an analysis of events leading up to it. It is a modest attempt to place before the reader facts as they appeared to one who played a small part in events, before and during this conflict.

The book was originally written soon after the War in 1966 and 1967. At that time I was fully occupied as the Chief Executive of an expanding airline. Since leaving the airline and my other government responsibilities in mid-1968, I have been involved in politics, which has kept me busy ever since. Thus I have had insufficient time, until the present, to see to the publication of this book. The time I spent in prison at Kot Lakhpat, Sahiwal and Sihala and my detention at Murree during 1977 provided me an opportunity to complete this work.

M Asghar Khan

a gift from
Jalib
(Irshad Ahmad Jakhar)

— Asghar Khan
Pak

Mc

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
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Except for the inclusion of Chapter XII 'A Visit to Peking', which has been written subsequently, I have left the original untouched. However, I have omitted certain opinions and details which I consider inexpedient to publish at this stage. These I may include in a later edition of this book, together with further material which should add to its interest and usefulness. There are a number of episodes that might well be added. But rather than further delay the publication of this book on that account, I decided that it should be published as a narrative written soon after the War. A second edition, mellowed by time, will perhaps provide a more balanced account of a War which appears now to have been fought for no purpose.

Abbottabad

Mohammed Asghar Khan
20th March, 1978

Chapter 1

Sound of the Trumpets

It was a sultry morning—4th September 1965—when I boarded the Pakistan International Airline's Viscount aircraft at Karachi for Rawalpindi. Having retired from the Pakistan Air Force I had joined the P.I.A. as its Chief Executive only six weeks earlier. Civilian passenger-flying was a new experience for me as I had usually flown, whether as a pilot or passenger, in Air Force aircraft, without the commotion that is associated with rail and air travel in Pakistan. On this flight I found myself sitting next to a prosperous businessman of Karachi. He was concerned about the international situation but more particularly about our ability to withstand an attack from India. He wanted to know whether I thought war was imminent. Having left my last appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Air

Force so recently, anything I might say was likely to be accepted by him as a reliable opinion and I was conscious, therefore, of the need to create confidence in his mind. I tried to evade some of his more direct enquiries. He was an inquisitive person and was only reassured when I told him that he need have no fear about Pakistan's ability to meet Indian aggression effectively. My simple but sincere opinion seemed to satisfy him, and he left me in peace for the rest of the flight.

As the Viscount flew towards Rawalpindi, my thoughts went back to my twenty four years with the Air Force. It had been a great experience, and the Air Force had meant more to me than just a career. I had been associated closely with its growth since 1947 and made a contribution towards its development in various appointments even before I took over command in 1957. Two of my brothers, Asif and Khalid, had been killed in the service of our Air Force: one in 1948, the first Pakistan Air Force fatal casualty, and the other, also in an air crash, in 1958. Their loss, which had meant more to me than most of my friends realised, had created a permanent bond which time will never remove. It was ironic, I felt, when war appeared so near, that I should be a civilian and a spectator. Throughout my service career, more particularly during the last eight years of

my command, we had worked hard to prepare the Air Force for the test that appeared to be just beginning. We had thought of many possible situations for which the Air Force was trained and poised, and I was naturally keen to be given the opportunity to be allowed to try out the ideas and concepts that I had laid down. Such were the thoughts that crossed my mind. I had already sought an interview with the President and, on arrival at Rawalpindi, I met Ayub Khan.

Over a period of eight years, ever since I assumed command of the Air Force in mid-1957, we had worked together, initially as colleagues and after 1958, when he became the President, Supreme Commander and Minister of Defence, this relationship naturally changed to that between a Head of State and the Head of a Service. Though never warm, this relationship was always fairly cordial.

Ayub Khan was a kind man. He was intelligent and shrewd. He possessed an imposing presence and believed that Pakistan needed him to steer her to prosperity and salvation. He understood little of air operations, except that a 'favourable air situation' was a desirable condition for the waging of war on land. In our eight years' association, I had, however, failed to convince him that in our situation, successful land operations would be

rendered impossible if the Air Force did not succeed in neutralising an enemy's Air Force. He preferred to see the Air Force as an arm of the Army, an airborne form of Artillery whose role should be to clear the way for the Infantry and Armour. I had maintained that this concept was fallacious, and that such support could only be provided after the Air Force had removed the threat from an enemy's air power. I had never really been able to convince him, but he had the good sense not to insist on his point of view, and had left me alone to get on with my task of preparing the Air Force on the lines that I thought best. I am sure he realised that if the Air Force had to be run and organised differently, he would have to find another man.

Ayub Khan's understanding of the country's maritime affairs was even less. Born and brought up in the feudal environment of the north, the sea and maritime strategy found no place in his thinking. He considered any expenditure on the Navy wasteful and did not appreciate that in our peculiar circumstances wherein the two wings of the country were physically separated by over a thousand miles of hostile territory, the sea provided the only reliable link between them.

As a result of serious differences of opinion with Ayub Khan over maritime affairs, Admiral Choudhri, the then

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, had resigned in 1959 and his place was taken over by the more docile A. R. Khan under whom the Navy had settled down to its traditional role of performing ceremonial functions.

Ayub Khan continued to make efforts to bring the other two services under the Army's influence, such as a proposal to give the Naval and Air Force cadets the early part of their training at the Pakistan Military Academy instead of the Naval and Air Force colleges. Another suggestion vigorously pursued by Ayub Khan was to change the uniforms and badges of rank of the other two services to those in use in the Army. Such suggestions, while accepted by the Navy, were resisted by me because I felt that these steps would gradually change the airman's attitude and thinking and would eventually lead to the development of an Air Force exclusively as a support arm of the Army with all the attendant consequences.

Such had been the tensions under which I had worked, but when I entered Ayub Khan's Office on 4th September, I did so with the knowledge that I was going to talk to an erstwhile colleague and Supreme Commander with whom, over a period of almost a decade, I had many opportunities of discussing the country's defence problems.

I stated briefly that I thought war was imminent, and since I had been responsible for drawing up the plans on which the Air Force would fight, I should be allowed to return to duty with my old service. Ayub Khan did not feel that the Indians would react so decisively and, whilst expressing appreciation of my offer, he said that there was 'nothing to worry about'. He said that he had been assured by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Foreign Minister, that Pakistan's incursion into Azad Kashmir would not provoke the Indians to extend the area of hostilities along the Indo-Pakistan border. I was amazed at this analysis of the situation and I reiterated that the events of the last few days in and over the Chamb area left little doubt in my mind that India would retaliate very soon. On my insisting that I should return to the Pakistan Air Force, the President enquired whether I was suggesting that I should return as the Commander-in-Chief. I replied that this was not my purpose in making the suggestion. It had been my fate to have relinquished command a few days before events had taken this turn and in fairness to my successor I could not suggest that I should replace him now. I would, I said, be happy to serve in any capacity so that my experience could be utilised. Ayub Khan re-stated his belief that aggression by India against Pakistan territory was unlikely. I was surprised at

his reponse and left his office hoping that his judgement of events was sounder than I considered it to be.

On my way from the President's Office to the Air Force Operations Room I recalled a Cabinet meeting about two years earlier, when the Indian military threat had been discussed. The Director of Inter-Services Intelligence had given a very lucid briefing on India's military build-up and had explained that by 1966 or 1967 the Indian Armed Forces, already three to four times as great as ours, would have a broad enough industrial base and adequate indigenous resources, in men and material, to be able to carry out a military adventure against Pakistan. Ayub Khan had then enquired as to what, then, was the answer? What were we to do?

The build-up of the Indian Armed Forces had been causing great concern to all thinking people in the Pakistan Armed Forces. Under the guise of preparations against China they had succeeded in securing substantial military aid from the United States and were building up a million-strong army, almost doubling their Air Force, increasing their Naval strength and further enhancing their aircraft and tank production capacities. When it was my turn to speak, I had suggested that the answer was clear. Pakistan was faced with a very dangerous situation. If we did not face up

to it and prepare ourselves immediately, the time would come when, having built up her Armed Forces sufficiently, India would be in a position to achieve her political objectives without recourse to war. Pakistan would still exist on the map, but we would probably be singing to India's tune and would cease to be an independent factor in international politics. The President had appeared irritated at my reply and asked how we could hope to compete with India and from where we could find the resources to improve our defence posture. I had argued that the only way was to tell the people plainly of the danger we were facing. Knowing their inherent patriotism, I felt that they could be counted upon to respond and would accept the sacrifices required of them. We must of necessity, I suggested, curtail our expenditure and thus find the money for defence. I warned the President that the Air Force, which possessed relatively inferior equipment, could not be expected to achieve the impossible for all time. Ayub Khan had appeared upset and had said that it was stupid to commit suicide just because one has to die one day. The people would not, he said, accept any further sacrifices. The level of taxation was already high and there would be a 'revolt' if it were raised any more. When I continued the argument, he said that he sympathised

with my views but the Air Force would have to get used to the situation. Sympathy was the last thing I had been seeking, and I said that if any individual needed sympathy it was he, the President. The defence of the country was his responsibility. I was only performing my duty by advising him on the situation as I saw it. I learnt later that, after the cabinet meeting, the President had expressed displeasure at my having spoken as I did. The President's inability to accept sincere criticism and advice was to lead to graver developments in the future.


The Air Operations Room in the Air Defence Headquarters was humming with activity. A sharp air engagement had taken place over the Chamb area a few days earlier in which the Pakistan Air Force had shot down four Indian fighters. Retaliation in some form was expected and the Air Force was poised to meet the challenge. The atmosphere was electric, and it was wonderful to be back amongst people I had worked with all these years. Mutual understanding and respect had developed between us during this long association and I soon forgot that I was now out of the service. We discussed the happenings of the last few days and possible future developments. There was little doubt in one's mind about the escalation of the conflict and no nervousness about the outcome. Air Marshal Nur Khan, who was

new in his command, was busy with the numerous details that were to be attended to in a situation developing so rapidly, and I took comfort in the thought that his entire staff were completely familiar with the planning that had gone on for years for just such a day.


After spending that day and the next at the Air Defence Headquarters I decided that I should return to Karachi on the morning of the 6th. I knew that one of the factors that would limit our capacity to wage war would be our almost complete dependence on the United States for even our simplest needs. This was particularly marked in a service operating sophisticated equipment, such as the Air Force. It was, therefore, vital that we should explore some other sources of supply so that we could be assured of replacement of essential equipment. It was obvious that this would not be forthcoming from our ally, the United States. Nazir Ahmed, the Defence Secretary, whom I saw during my stay in Rawalpindi, welcomed the idea, and I planned to leave for Iran and Turkey to see my friends, Generals Khatemi and Tansel, the Air Chiefs of the two countries, to find out what we could expect in the way of assistance. In order that I might keep in touch with developments, I asked one of the staff officers in the Air Defence Headquarters to prepare a set of maps for me of the entire border area with

India. I would collect these at 7 a.m. on the 6th, before I left for Karachi. I had intended to use these maps for reference should hostilities break out during my visit abroad.

Before I narrate the events of the next few days, let us look briefly at the map which shows certain basic characteristics of Pakistan's defence as they were in September 1965. This should help the reader to understand better the events that followed.


U S S R
Mazar Sharif
Karakorams
Gilgit
Baltistan
Chitral
CEASE FIRE LINE
Muzaffarabad
Jammu
Kashmir
Ladakh
Srinagar
Kabul
Jalalabad
Peshawar
Islamabad
Rawalpindi
Kohat
Afghanistan
Kotli
Akhnur
Chamb
Pathankot
Wazirabad
Gujranwala
Narowal
Sargodha
Wagah
Amritsar
Adampur
Lahore
Khem
Karan
Jallundhur
Harike
Kandhar
Ferozepur
Chandigarh
Halwara
Ambala
Quetta
Multan
West Pakistan
Delhi
New Delhi
Iran
Sukkur
Jodhpur
I N
Rajasthan
Karachi
Jamnagar
Nagpur
Aurangabad
References :-
1 Cease fire line
2. Air Bases
3. Rivers
Bombay
Ahmadnagar
Puna
Usmanabad
Shulapur

India and Pakistan 1965



Chapter II

A Time for Decision

The night of 5th September was peaceful and when I left Flashman's Hotel at about 6 o'clock the following morning for the Air Defence Headquarters, only five minutes' driving distance, few knew that the Indian offensive against West Pakistan had begun. Even the approaches to the Air Defence Headquarters and the airmen on duty outside did not give any indication that this day was any different. I entered the Operations Room and approached the Officer for the set of maps which I had asked him to keep ready. He met me with a smile but I noticed that everybody was rather tense and busier than usual. Instinctively I knew that it had begun. Air Commodore Akhtar, who had remained on duty that night, confirmed that the Indians had crossed the border near Wagah and reports were fast coming in of

Indian advances at a number of other places. We watched the situation develop for a while. Within that hour, Indian fighters attacked a passenger train in the Gujranwala area inflicting a few civilian casualties. No attack had taken place in East Pakistan.

Nur Khan arrived shortly afterwards and he, Akhtar and I discussed the situation. We were puzzled as to why the Indians, having started what amounted to a general war, had limited the offensive to the west only and why, having decided to start an offensive against West Pakistan alone, they had not used their Air Force against our vital installations, such as airfields and radar. By not doing so, they had given us a chance which we had never counted on—the chance to deliver the first aerial attack. I was anxious that we should take the offensive without delay.

I knew that the earliest we could mount a full scale attack was at dusk that day. Our plans required about eight hours' clear notice being given to all operational units. On receipt of these a number of moves were to take place culminating in a full scale attack on all Indian air bases opposite East and West Pakistan. It was vital for the smooth launching of this strike that the decision be taken by about 10.00 o'clock that morning.

During the discussions a few other officers joined in,

and at least one suggested that we should wait and fight defensively; that is, we should not launch an offensive but wait to be attacked. It was argued that over our own territory we would have the advantage of our own radar and could hope to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy. This line of argument was probably new to Nur Khan, who had returned to the Air Force after six years with P.I.A. and had not been with his new staff very long. I had been discussing these plans for the last eight years and was familiar with this timid view which I had firmly rejected in the past. The idea is theoretically attractive but militarily unsound. Defence can never lead to victory. The very concept confers the initiative on the enemy, ties down a large force on the ground which could be used to attack the enemy, and allows an intelligent enemy to use a small offensive effort to create larger diversions which ultimately lead to defeat.

I expressed my views again but this time without the authority of office. I suggested a course of action that I knew was the only one we could safely adopt. Air Commodore Akhtar and Air Commodore Rahim Khan were both enthusiastic about it, and Nur Khan agreed that this was the right thing to do. I then hurried off to see the President to apprise him of the action the Air Force proposed to take and, on its behalf, to seek his

approval.

Earlier that morning, when the Indian army had begun to move into Pakistan territory in the Wagah area, the first screens of the Pakistan Air Force Wireless Observer Wing—that magnificent force which had always performed splendidly—had reported these movements to the Air Defence Headquarters. Even before the army had fully grasped the significance of these moves the Air Defence Headquarters had begun to react to the situation. Air Force units were alerted and the President informed. It was characteristic of the high state of preparedness of the Air Force that the first person to inform the President of the Indian attack was an airman. Air Commodore Akhtar, who was on duty at the Air Defence Headquarters on the night of 5th/6th September telephoned the President in the early hours of 6th September to inform him of the Indian troop movements across the international border.

For at least six years the Pakistan Air Force had maintained continuous readiness posture in all its operational units. Radar stations had been functioning night and day with personnel on duty round the clock. Fighter pilots and ground personnel had been sitting in their aircraft in the severest cold and in scorching heat, in rain and sunshine, ready to leap into the air to meet any intruder into

Pakistan's air space. We had believed that the defence services are paid to safeguard the integrity of the country and must be ready at all times to meet the challenge. It was not for us in the defence services to assume that an attack was likely or unlikely at a given time. Our job was to fight, and we were required to remain ready to perform our role even when war appeared unlikely. This is the only philosophy a fighting service must adopt. But I know from experience that paying lip service to this concept is not enough. To carry it out requires dedication and a very high quality of leadership, more so when things appear peaceful. With the right spirit lacking, the armed forces can easily slide into a state of make-believe and fall out of step with their real role in national life. I hope that this will never happen in Pakistan, because if it does, our security will be in serious jeopardy.

When Ayub Khan received me in his office he appeared worried and it was obvious that he had been surprised by the Indian action. I explained briefly the Air Force plan and told him that it was intended to carry it out by attacking at dusk that day. He agreed, but said that since East Pakistan had not been attacked it would be better not to launch strikes against enemy airfields in that area. He felt that, considering our difficulties there,

it was not in our interest to start hostilities on the Eastern Front. Before leaving, I assured him that he need have no apprehension about the Air Force's ability to discharge its responsibility with credit. Almost as an afterthought I said that I proposed to stay on in Rawalpindi.

As I left his office I saw Walter P. McConaughy, the U.S. Ambassador, arrive to see Ayub Khan. I heard later of his almost triumphant and exceedingly insolent remark as he entered Ayub Khan's office. 'Well Mr. President, they have got you by the throat, haven't they?' If these were not his exact words they certainly reflected the American mood and conduct prior to, and during, the hostilities.

When I got back to the Air Defence Headquarters, I found a discussion in progress again about the merits of taking the offensive. It is impossible to obtain complete unanimity of views in all matters, especially when risk of life and survival is involved. Hesitation and wavering is more pronounced in such circumstances. That is why planning for war is best done in peace time. All possible contingencies should be thought of and plans to meet each one of these worked out in the minutest detail. This is what we had endeavoured to do in the previous few years. Nur Khan had been away from the Air Force for six years and was naturally anxious to examine all

aspects of the problem before taking a decision. The implications of this decision could be grave and his hesitation annoying (as it was to me at the time) but it was nevertheless understandable. As he listened to the divergent views of his staff, my anxiety at the consequences of the delay began to grow. I was convinced that if we did not put in the first attack the consequences would be serious. As it was, the possibility of the Indians launching an air attack at dusk could not be ruled out. This, however, I had thought unlikely since by launching an attack at dusk they would give us a night to recover. If they had intended to attack us first their best time was the early hours in the morning of the 6th. Since they had launched a pre-arranged attack the omission of the Air Force was deliberate. However, situations and ideas change, and an air attack by them could not be ruled out. Ten o'clock in the morning, which I had set as the deadline for decision, was now well past and the discussion continued. These must have been the most frustrating moments of my life.

The decision to launch the offensive was finally taken at about 3 p.m. The attack was to be launched at the Indian airfields simultaneously a few minutes after sunset. Since sunset in the Northern Area was at 6 p.m., this meant that there was only about two hours' warning

given for take off, whereas the minimum time desirable was about eight hours. The whole operation was a very delicate one and required clockwork precision.

Sixteen aircraft were to take off from Sargodha for Adampur and Halwara, the two Indian air bases in East Punjab, eight aircraft from Peshawar against Pathankot and eight from Mauripur against Jamnagar. It had been planned that all the aircraft should take off so as to arrive at the Indian border at the same time. This simultaneous approach would give the Indians the least warning of our approach and all their airfields would receive the minimum possible warning of the raid. Our arrival at the targets was, therefore, to be necessarily staggered, depending on their distance from the border. Approaches were to be made at low level, below Indian radar cover.

Sargodha had the largest number of aircraft operating. They had not yet received orders for the attack and had been busy providing air support to the army defending Lahore. Those aircraft that were not employed in support of ground operations were being kept on a defensive alert, which meant without bombs and rockets. On receiving orders to attack enemy airfields they had to re-arm their aircraft with the weapons required for ground attack and could not complete in time the

various steps required to be taken. Their take-off was thus delayed. This had two serious implications. Our attack on Pathankot would give prior warning to Indian defences everywhere that they could expect other strikes, and a higher state of preparedness was thus to be expected when we attacked Adampur and Halwara. Indian fighters were likely to be airborne in defence of these airfields, thus increasing the chances of our aircraft being intercepted and the probability of our suffering casualties. It would also mean that our aircraft would arrive on the targets later than planned. Since the planned time of the strike was about five minutes after sunset any delay would reduce the usefulness of our attacks, which would be made in failing light.

The force at Mauripur was also faced with a similar problem and the delay in taking a decision upset their timing in the same manner. About half an hour before take-off time, the Air Defence Headquarters were informed by Sargodha and Mauripur that they would not be able to keep to the timing, nor would Sargodha be able to put up all her aircraft as all could not be got ready in the time available. Pilots at Peshawar were awaiting confirmation of the decision to attack which was conveyed to them after they had started up their aircraft and whilst they were awaiting permission to taxi out.

The attack on Pathankot led by Squadron Leader S. H. Hyder, though slightly delayed, went off well and considerable damage was done. An hour or so before sunset the Indians had sent a large force over the Chamb area and had attacked our ground positions. This force was supported for the first time by MIG-21 fighters which had apparently been moved up that day to Pathankot from Chandigarh. These aircraft had landed at Pathankot after their strike and were being refuelled when our attack took place. Unfortunately the attack on Adampur and Halwara suffered from the inevitable results of indecision and delay.

Chapter III

The Few

The Pathankot attack had given the Indians warning of our intentions and they had their aircraft airborne to meet our attacks on Adampur and Halwara. These were led by Squadron Leaders Alam and Rafique respectively—pilots of great skill and determination. To add to their problems a dust haze lay over most of East Punjab. They met Indian fighters soon after they passed Amritsar and it was obvious to them that surprise had been lost. Alam, who was to attack Adampur, detected several enemy aircraft patrolling the approaches to the airfield and taking skilful avoiding action brought his aircraft back to Sargodha. Rafique tried to break through the enemy defences to Halwara and was engaged by enemy fighters. In the engagement that ensued his formation shot down three enemy Hunters. Bad visibility, failing

light and enemy opposition prevented Rafique's formation from reaching Halwara and they decided to fight their way back to Sargodha. On their flight home, Rafique's guns jammed, but he decided to stay with his formation in order to guide them and to keep the enemy busy. Flying in this manner, unarmed but undaunted, he was shot down somewhere near Jullundur. The Pakistan Air Force had lost a great fighter pilot. But before his death he had, over the Chamb area alone, accounted for three enemy aircraft destroyed and set an example which was to inspire the fighter force at Sargodha to greater things in the next few days.

In the south the attack on Jamnagar had gone off fairly well although, here too, the delay in taking the decision had caused some confusion. This to some extent reduced the effect of our strike, which would otherwise have produced better results. A part of the bomber force of four B-57 aircraft had been moved earlier to Peshawar and the Bomber Wing at Mauripur had consequently been reduced in strength. Whilst discussions were in progress at the Air Defence Headquarters in Rawalpindi about the merits of taking the offensive, instructions were received at Mauripur that all available B-57 aircraft were to be sent immediately to Peshawar. Probably in the confused discussion that

was taking place at Rawalpindi someone had taken the initiative and had decided that it would be prudent to have all the available B-57 aircraft moved to Peshawar. When, therefore, the orders were received by Mauripur at about 4.30 p.m. that the aircraft of the B-57 Wing were to strike at Jamnagar at dusk, there was some confusion. Most of the available aircraft were at that moment taxiing out to take-off for Peshawar and were called back to their dispersal point. The pilots were informed of their mission. In the time available before dusk hurried preparations were made and, like the aircraft from Sargodha, the formation of six B-57's, the maximum that could be got ready in the time available, departed for their target later than the planned time. Thus they arrived at Jamnagar in partial darkness and this, with the layer of broken low clouds that hung over the area, made their task difficult. Jamnagar was, however, identified and successfully bombed. No. 31 Bomber Wing kept up their attacks throughout the night and later played an important role in attacking enemy fighter airfields at night in the face of strong ground defences.

The result of the first day appeared encouraging. We had got in the first punch and had given the Indian Air Force a bloody nose. It had been decided to follow this

up with attacks at night by our bombers, and B-57 aircraft from Peshawar and Mauripur carried out night attacks on Adampur, Halwara, Pathankot and Jamnagar. These attacks were followed in the early hours of the morning by paradrops in the vicinity of selected airfields. Thus, when dawn broke on 7th September, we knew that the Indian Air Force had had quite a pasting. Their reaction the following day showed that the treatment they had received had left them groggy.

7th September was a busy day for the Pakistan Air Force. At around mid-day we received information from Dacca that our fighters had attacked the Indian Air Force base at Kailkunda in Bihar and had inflicted considerable damage. It was estimated that fourteen Canberra Bomber aircraft had been destroyed on the ground and another six Canberras and four Hunters damaged. We had lost one aircraft in the air. Our first reaction was one of surprise as no instructions had been sent to Group Captain Haider, the Officer commanding Pakistan Air Force in East Pakistan about the launching of this attack. Apparently, in the excitement at the Air Defence Headquarters it had been forgotten that Haider's standing instructions had been that if he should ever receive positive confirmation that war had broken out in the West, he should automatically implement the war plan and

launch attacks on pre-selected targets in India. This specific instruction had been given under my direction a long time earlier to meet the possibility of a breakdown in our communications or jamming of our radio frequencies by the Indians. In this particular case, no breakdown of communications had occurred but Haider, on hearing the President's broadcast on the 6th that we were at war, decided rightly to implement the plan without waiting for further confirmation. This action characterised his conduct throughout the conflict, and the Pakistan Air Force in the East fought a lone battle with great determination and skill.

Whilst the Air Force was fighting this crucial battle for control of the air space, the army was busy recovering from the initial effects of a surprise attack and meeting the Indian moves. The initiative on the land was with the Indians. It was not clear on the 7th whether the offensive against Lahore was their main thrust or whether this was a diversionary attack to be followed by a major attack in another area. The key to this information was the Indian armour, and our General Headquarters had no clear idea of the whereabouts of their armoured formations. Some intelligence reports had come in, and from a study of these and from certain air reconnaissance reports it was concluded that the Indian

armour was on the move due west from Jullundur. The Air Force was asked to strike at the bridge over the Beas river so as to interrupt this concentration of armour. Bridges are not a profitable target for aircraft to take on—unless of course the effort is large enough to be effective—but because of the importance of Indian armour, a few missions were flown to bomb the Beas bridge. Some close misses were observed but the bridge remained intact. The general opinion in the G.H.Q. Operations Room by the evening of the 7th was that the Indian armour was concentrating behind Amritsar to be used to support the advance against Lahore. In order, perhaps, not to give them too much time to concentrate, it was decided—although I was not present at any of the discussions—to launch our armour in the main counter-attack in the Khem Karan area south and east of Lahore. It was hoped that this attack, which was to be spearheaded by No. 1 Armoured Division and supported by an infantry brigade of No. 11 division, would penetrate the enemy's defences in this relatively lightly defended area and move astride the Harike road. It would thus threaten Amritsar and, if possible, bypassing the city, would outflank the Indian positions opposite the Lahore front.

The concept was bold, but it suffered from three

serious weaknesses. A clear picture of Indian intentions was not available, the locations of their armour were not really known, and the commitment of our armour without clearly anticipating the next move of the Indians was a risky undertaking. An Infantry Division, which was to support the advance of the Armoured Division, had been taken away a few days earlier from this strike force to reinforce the battle in the Chamb area thus seriously weakening the main striking force of the Pakistan Army. In our anxiety to maintain secrecy even senior commanders in the counter-attack force had been kept in the dark about their role, objectives and the exact area of operation. Large scale maps, which are essential for fighting a land battle, were not available with commanders until about twenty four hours after the attack had been launched. These grave handicaps, coupled with indifferent top leadership, doomed this move to failure, and it had become clear by the next day that the armoured thrust had failed. To top it all, information was beginning to come in that the bulk of India's armour was concentrating opposite Sialkot in the Jammu area.

By the evening of the 8th it was becoming clear that a considerable build-up of Indian forces had taken place in this area and an enemy thrust might take place there to by-pass Sialkot and threaten the defences of Lahore from

the north and the rear. On 11th September a decision was taken to disengage as much of our armour from the Khem Karan area as possible and to move it to face the fast developing Indian threat in the Sialkot area. On the 12th, orders were issued for the move of two armoured brigades of No. 1 Armoured Division from the Khem Karan area to Wazirabad. The move was to be by road and rail. This was quite an operation, and because of the urgency of the situation it had to be conducted by daylight. It was expected that during the move the armour would be exposed to Indian air attacks. The move was started on the night of the 13th/14th September and completed in the early hours of the 15th. Throughout, the Air Force remained vigilant and ready to engage in a major battle for the protection of our armour. Happily, the Indians did not react, probably through lack of knowledge of the move.

In the meantime, the air battle had gone markedly in our favour. The Indians had suffered heavy casualties and were beginning to show the effects of fatigue. Having fought with some determination on the first two days, they were now showing reluctance to engage in combat.

The heaviest attacks took place on 7th September on Sargodha. In a total of four raids they used nineteen

aircraft. Of these ten were shot down and three damaged. We lost a F-86 aircraft on the ground and a F-104 in the air when it flew through the debris of an Indian Mystere Fighter it had just destroyed. The pilot bailed out safely. Although the Pakistan Air Force had done well, its defences had been fairly stretched. Pilots had flown four to five sorties each and some had not slept for two nights running. Much depended on the Indian Air Force's capacity to accept such heavy losses and their ability to keep us under as heavy pressure as they had in the previous twenty four hours. This would, we felt, determine the outcome of the contest.

The answer came on 8th September. Between dawn and dusk the Indians flew only six missions against army gun areas. No airfield was attacked during daylight, but five Canberra Bomber aircraft flew night missions over Pakistan territory during the night of the 8th/9th September without doing any damage. This confirmed that the Indians had had more than they had bargained for. By then we had claimed twenty eight aircraft destroyed, fourteen damaged on the ground (mostly in the first attack), thirty one shot down and another six damaged. In addition, one Gnat fighter had been forced to land at a Pakistan airfield. The Indian Air Force had thus lost sixty aircraft and had twenty aircraft damaged in the

first eight days of air hostilities. Our own losses had been twelve aircraft, including those lost through accidents.

As already mentioned, the Navy had no defined place in Ayub Khan's overall strategic plans for the defence of Pakistan, and was consequently left on its own to draw up its war plans and to fight its own war in the manner it thought fit. The naval staff had followed very closely the developments in Kashmir and had, on their own, disposed their ships at sea in accordance with their war plans.

During the whole of 6th and 7th September, our Naval Task Forces operating in the Arabian Sea and off the West coast of India failed to make any contact with the enemy, who being mortally afraid of our submarine *Ghazi*, had considered it prudent to seek shelter within the confines of its own harbours. This feeling of frustration due to a lack of combat with the enemy was more than offset by the lightning action of Admiral Ahsan, then Chairman of the Inland Water Transport Authority in East Pakistan, in capturing the entire fleet of more than one hundred Indian coastal shipping vessels along with their valuable cargo. There were no naval forces in East Pakistan at that time and this action by Admiral Ahsan was, therefore, all the more creditable.

Our Navy decided on 7th September to strike a blow at the enemy in their own backwaters. A precisely worked out and boldly executed midnight bombardment of Dwarka, near the Rann of Kutch, was carried out by our Fleet during the night of the 7th/8th September. This lowered the morale of the Indians considerably and raised the morale of our Navy. This action proved so effective that the Indian Navy did not come out during the rest of the war to interfere with our merchant ships bringing vital supplies of fuel, stores and ammunition to Karachi and Chittagong. Having established effective maritime control over the Arabian Sea, our Navy was keen to intercept on the high seas the merchant ships taking supplies to India but was stopped from doing so by our Foreign Office for fear of international opinion.

Chapter IV

The Silk Route to China

Having seen the results of the second day's operations I knew that the Pakistan Air Force had the situation well under control. I now felt that the time had come when I could leave Rawalpindi to get some urgently required equipment and stores from friendly countries. I considered that I should proceed first to China and Indonesia, and later to Turkey and Iran, to try and meet our essential requirements. Ayub Khan agreed, and I obtained a brief from General Headquarters and Air Headquarters. The Army's immediate requirements were ammunition and explosives, but their main need was to get the Chinese to move up against the North East Frontier Agency and Ladakh areas so that pressure against us in West Pakistan could be reduced.

The Air Force had never possessed any reserves of aircraft. Every aircraft lost, therefore, meant that the strength of our Air Force would be reduced almost daily until it ceased to be an effective weapon of war. The Indians, with their vastly superior numbers, could reasonably expect this to happen in about two to three months' time, even if they themselves received crippling blows in the meantime. They could always pull back part of their Air Force beyond the reach of our air bases and so protect their air effort and prolong the effective life of their air arm. The Pakistan Air Force thus urgently required fighter aircraft and the vast complex of weapons, equipment, explosives and spares that support air operations. Only the Chinese had some capacity to provide these, and it was felt that the Indonesians might also be willing to help. With Ayub Khan's personal messages for Premier Chou En Lai and President Soekarno I left for Karachi on the morning of 9th September and later the same day by a P.I.A. Boeing for Peking.

We flew over Kashmir and Chinese Turkistan direct to Peking. The flight took nearly seven hours and I arrived at Peking at about 3 a.m. on the morning of 10th September. I saw Chou En Lai later in the day. He was very interested in the military situation and appeared to know

a great deal about it. He congratulated me on the performance of the air force but expressed some apprehension about the situation on the ground. Chou En Lai said that our army appeared to be on the defensive and suggested that, in view of our numerical inferiority, it was important that we should take the initiative and by use of mobility and surprise keep the Indians on the defensive. This was an elementary lesson in strategy, but how often are simple things forgotten. He talked at some length and asked General Raza (our Ambassador) and me to stay on for lunch. I had delivered Ayub Khan's letter and explained that we were in a difficult position and needed assistance. I informed the Prime Minister that our immediate requirements were some fighter aircraft and some anti-aircraft guns and ammunition. Ayub Khan was keen that this assistance should be channelled through Indonesia, and in accordance with his instructions I suggested that these items should be sent to Indonesia from where we would arrange to collect them. Chou En Lai appeared surprised at the suggestion and said that it would be easier to fly these aircraft over the Karakorams as routing these via Indonesia would cause unnecessary complications and delay. Anti-aircraft weapons could also be transported directly to Pakistan. He gave firm figures of the number of aircraft that they

could make available and also of the anti-aircraft weapons. He also mentioned the dates when these would be ready for collection. I thanked him for his prompt response but explained that I would have to refer the matter of the routing of this equipment to my Government and would convey to them details of his offer. I was to go to Djakarta to see President Soekarno that evening and I told Chou En Lai that one of the things I would do there was to explore ways and means of transporting Chinese equipment to Pakistan through that country.

I then explained the military situation as we saw it and said that we felt that Chinese moves on India's northern borders would help to reduce the pressure against us in West Pakistan. He asked what exactly was my understanding of the manner in which they were to move against India. I replied that we were aware that any move by China against India would have certain international implications. It was for them to weigh these and I requested that, whilst doing so, they should consider the situation in which we were placed. The extent to which China could move and the nature of her action was, therefore, a matter for them to determine. So far as we were concerned, we would, for the present, be satisfied if China concentrated forces on India's borders

without any overt military action. Further action could be determined in the light of future military developments. He said that any action that China took would indeed have serious international implications. China, however, was vitally interested in Pakistan's security and could not stand idle whilst we were being attacked. He then enquired whether I would be staying on in Peking until the next day as he could then give me a more positive answer. I explained that I had to leave the same day for Djakarta where I was to see President Soekarno and I would appreciate a reply before I left. Chou En Lai then left the table to use the telephone. When he joined us about 15 minutes later, he said that he had been talking with President Liu Shao Chi and they were both of the view that my proposal had such serious implications as to make it necessary for them to discuss things with Ayub Khan. He suggested that they could meet at Peking or Rawalpindi or at any other place our President found convenient. I said that I would convey their wish to Ayub Khan. Premier Chou En Lai added that it was important for them to know whether we really meant to fight until our political objectives were achieved. I said that I had no doubt that Pakistan would fight to the end.

Before leaving for Djakarta, I thanked him for his

courtesy and we agreed that I should stop briefly at Peking on my way home to apprise Chou En Lai of my talks with President Soekarno. I left for Djakarta at about midnight, and after a brief refuelling halt at Canton, headed south for the Indonesian capital. As our Boeing flew south over the China Sea I reflected on the military situation and the implications of the Chinese intervention in this conflict. Chou En Lai's response had been more positive than we had a right to expect. I was impressed by his charm and his grasp of detail. He was familiar with the performance of different types of weapons, and although we talked in some detail about weapons and their performance, he never once referred to notes whilst mentioning figures.

When we arrived over Indonesia we were told to land at a military airfield about one hundred miles from Djakarta. We diverted to this airfield, which was a bomber base, and I was met on arrival by my friend Omar Dhani, the Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Air Force. He explained that President Soekarno was anxious to keep my visit a secret and had therefore decided that our Boeing should not land at Djakarta civil airport. Omar Dhani and I left immediately for Djakarta by an Indonesian military plane and on arrival we were driven to the President's palace. I had met Soekarno on a

previous visit to Indonesia two years earlier. He received me immediately on arrival and was his usual self. I gave him Ayub Khan's letter, which he read carefully. In this letter the President had said that he expected Indonesia to help us in our 'dire' need. 'Your dire need? It is our dire need', he said. Soekarno went on to say that he had had a meeting of the War Council the previous day and they had decided that Indonesia would give all possible help to Pakistan. He said India's attack on Pakistan was like an attack on Indonesia and they were duty bound to give us all possible assistance. He asked me to consider Indonesia as my own country and take away from there whatever I found would be useful to Pakistan in this emergency. 'But remember', he added, 'that we also have a problem—our conflict with Malaysia'. He suggested that whilst deciding what I should take away, I should, bearing in mind Indonesia's needs, decide what should be left behind. These were, he said, his instructions to Subandrio* and I should discuss details with him and Omar Dhani.

Some 18 months after my meeting with Soekarno it was announced that he had been dismissed. Whatever his weaknesses, he, more than any other man I know,

* Foreign Minister and head of the Joint National Defence Command.

made a gesture towards Pakistan that our future generations will always remember, and even if Soekarno is forgotten by his countrymen, Pakistanis will remember that when we were in 'dire' need Indonesia gave Pakistan the key to her arsenal. That the arsenal was not overfull did not make the gesture any the less important. In fact, it enhanced the value of the offer made by a great nation, itself faced with serious problems of only slightly lesser military significance. I have often wondered if Pakistan will ever be able to repay this debt.

Soekarno possessed great charm, and it was not difficult to see why he held complete sway over the Indonesian nation for such a long time. On leaving him, I conferred with Subandrio and Omar Dhani. I explained that our immediate need was some high performance fighter aircraft. Since they had some MIG-21 aircraft, I asked how these were deployed. Omar Dhani explained that they had only twelve and that four were deployed for the defence of Western Java, four for the defence of Eastern Java, and four in reserve. Considering their own needs and what President Soekarno had said, I did not feel that I should ask for more than four MIG–21 aircraft. Although four aircraft would be of limited value, when added to our own eleven F–104s these would provide some addition to the deterrent. I therefore asked Omar Dhani whether he could give us the four aircraft

in reserve. 'You have heard the President', he said, 'you can have anything you want.' I then enquired about their MIG–19 aircraft and Omar Dhani agreed to give all of them to us. He also agreed to give us a few MIG–15s. It was agreed that these should be dismantled and crated by the Indonesian Air Force and carried in Indonesian ships. Martadinata, the Indonesian Naval Commander-in-Chief, was there and I asked whether he felt happy about taking this equipment to Karachi and whether he feared interference by the Indian Navy. He said that the ships would be escorted and he would ensure that the cargo was delivered safely at Karachi. When we had finished discussing the details of the assistance that we could expect from Indonesia, I prepared to leave for Peking on my way to Pakistan. As I got up to go, Martadinata asked whether this was all I wanted Indonesia to do for Pakistan. 'What more can you do?' I asked. 'Don't you want us to take over the Andaman Islands? A look at the map will show', he continued, 'that the Andaman and Nicobar islands are an extension of Sumatra and are in any case between East Pakistan and Indonesia. What right have the Indians to be there?' I suggested that he should discuss the matter with his President. In the present situation there would certainly be no regret on the part of Pakistan if Indonesia occupied

these islands. Unfortunately we were not in a position to assist them in performing this task. 'In any case', he said, 'the Indonesian Navy will immediately commence patrols of the approaches to these islands and carry out aerial reconnaissance missions to see what the Indians have there.' I thanked him for his support and, along with Omar Dhani, left for the military airfield where our Boeing was waiting.

Martadinata backed his words with substantial material aid for the Pakistan Navy. He ordered immediate transfer of two submarines and four 'OSSA' missile boats to Pakistan. In the previous year ships of the Pakistan Navy had paid a goodwill visit to Indonesia and cordial understanding had been established between the two navies. Realising the acute needs of Pakistan and appreciating the imbalance between our Navy and the Indian Navy, Martadinata acted swiftly and sincerely. At that time Indonesia was heading for a confrontation with Great Britain over the Straits of Malacca where a sizeable Task Force of British carriers and other big ships had been stationed. The missile boats were the only deterrent force available to the Indonesians. Moreover, the submarines and the missile boats had been given to Indonesia by the U.S.S.R. under a bilateral treaty which forbade their transfer to another

country. It was therefore an act of great courage and friendship on the part of Soekarno and his naval Commander-in-Chief to transfer these vessels to Pakistan at that time.

On my return to Pakistan, I briefed the Commander-in-Chief of our Navy, Admiral A. R. Khan, who established a direct link with Martadinata. The submarines and the missile boats arrived in Pakistan waters after the cease-fire due to the distance involved but they stayed with us till such time as the chances of recurrence of hostilities had receded. I was later told that the submarines were in fact ordered to proceed to Pakistan direct from their sea patrols and were not allowed to put into home ports even for a change of clothing for their personnel.

After he retired from the navy in 1966, Martadinata was appointed Ambassador to Pakistan. A greater friend of this country could not have represented Indonesia in Islamabad. Unfortunately within two months of his taking up the appointment, he was killed in a helicopter accident in Indonesia when he was there on leave.

On my return to Peking I met Chou En Lai again and informed him briefly of my talks in Djakarta. He had little to add to what he had said about Chinese concern over developments on our border and he re-emphasised the urgent need for a meeting with Ayub Khan. He was

also concerned with a news report that Pakistan was considering a United Nations' proposal for a cease-fire with 'neutral' countries providing military forces for policing Jammu and Kashmir. He was very sceptical about such a proposal and said that there were no neutral countries in the world today. He added that the United Nations had no capacity for good and had never succeeded in solving any problem. United Nations military forces, wherever used, had only acted as agents for imperialism and had created rather than solved problems. The only example in the United Nations' history, when a U.N. military force had gone in, performed its role honestly and come out, was Pakistan's military contingent to Indonesia. He said that it would be naive for us to expect any good to come out of such an offer. When the word 'naive' was used by the interpreter, Chou En Lai, who understood English, interrupted him and said that it was not what he had meant. 'Unwise' would be more in line with his thinking. Naive or unwise, there was no doubt about the correctness of his advice in this matter. He said that though the reply that he understood Pakistan had given was not what he had hoped for, it was, he felt, satisfactory inasmuch as India would not at present be prepared to accept these conditions. When India rejected this proposal, as he felt she

was certain to do, we could raise our terms for a settlement the next time. If we continued our struggle, he said, the day would surely come when the Indians would accept our terms. Little did he know, nor I, that within ten days Pakistan would be seeking to end the conflict on almost any terms.

I was back in Rawalpindi within three days of having left it and I briefed Ayub Khan on my visit. I suggested that he should meet the Chinese leaders as required by Premier Chou En Lai. He was not prepared to do this and said that he did not see what useful purpose this would serve. 'Why,' he said, 'does he want to meet me?' 'They want to be reassured,' I replied, 'that we intend to fight, before they make an important commitment on India's northern borders. They want to look into your eyes to see whether you will see this thing through.' Ayub Khan obviously knew what his eyes would show, for in spite of repeated requests from the Chinese leaders, he did not, for fear of annoying our Western allies, meet them until well after the war had ended.

Chapter V

Beaverbrook without Churchill

During my absence from Pakistan, the Indian Air Force had bombed Peshawar, and although they had done little damage to the airfield, a number of civilians had been killed in the city and in nearby villages. The air traffic control building and a portion of a hangar had been hit. It was lucky that no aircraft were destroyed because our bombers were at the time lined in strength on the airfield loaded with bombs and fuel in preparation for a raid on Indian airfields. Although a few aircraft received splinters, no aircraft was seriously damaged. The Indian raid over, our bombers took off to return the compliment, leaving behind more telling memories of their visit. The Indians also bombed Kohat and repeated the attack on Peshawar. In both these raids no serious

damage was done to air force property, although civilians again suffered.

Sargodha had also been visited by Indian Canberras at night. This airfield remained the main target for Indian attacks at night throughout the war. Although the Indian Air Force dropped an estimated 500,000 lbs. of bombs in the area around Sargodha airfield, it did remarkably little damage. The net damage on the airfield was one fire-crash tender damaged and its driver injured a twenty five foot crater near, but not on, the landing strip. One bomb hit a village about six miles away from the airfield killing twenty one inhabitants.

Apart from these night bombing raids, the Indian Air Force had been relatively inactive and the Pakistan Air Force was in command of the situation. Indian aircraft had given up day-time adventures. Sporadic raids at night were to continue for another few days with little more than nuisance effect. The situation on the ground was less encouraging. Our armour, which had been moved to the Gujranwala-Wazirabad area, was being used to contain the Indian advance towards the Lahore-Rawalpindi railway line. The Indians had made some gains in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors but the momentum of their attack had been lost and the battle was now static.

The army had been using up its ammunition faster than expected and it was considered desirable to arrange replenishment of these stocks. Our weapons were American supplied and the only countries that had similar weapons and could be expected to help were Iran and Turkey. They were also operating the same aircraft as we were and I thought it necessary to visit Teheran and Ankara. Armed with Ayub Khan's letters for President Gursel and the Shahinshah of Iran, I left for Karachi on my way to Ankara and Teheran. Karachi was a transformed city. Black-out was effective and complete and trenches had been dug extensively for use as bomb shelters. A few Indian aircraft had flown over the city but no part of Karachi had been bombed or damaged. I understood that All India Radio, in reporting the success of these bombing raids over Karachi, had said that Bunder Road lay in ruins and that serious damage had been done to the Lyari Air Force base. Lyari is well known for its fishing colony, for its odours and for a few other unattractive characteristics, but not for its air base. The airfield at Mauripur had been untouched. In Karachi I saw Admiral A. R. Khan at his headquarters and then left for Ankara.

President Gursel received me kindly and, after an exchange of views on the military situation, said that

Turkey would do whatever was possible to help us in this emergency. I later called on General Tansel, the Air Commander-in-Chief, and the Prime Minister, Mr. Orguplu. It was obvious that the Turks were under some strain and were embarrassed by the situation. All their equipment was American and they were wholly dependent on the United States for their day-to-day military needs. They were members of NATO, to which all their military forces and resources were allotted. It was not proper for them to supply any weapons to Pakistan without informing NATO and obtaining their consent. It was also unlikely that they could send major items of equipment such as aircraft or tanks without their NATO allies getting to know that this had been done. The Prime Minister explained that he was the head of a coalition and, like most coalitions, his Government had no common views on many issues. On the issue of the Indo-Pakistan war, he said, they were unanimous in their support of their Pakistani brethren, but they were divided on the manner in which this assistance could or should be given. One party would like to go all the way in their support of Pakistan; a second party would prefer to adopt a cautious approach, giving us all possible material assistance without in any way jeopardising Turkey's own international relations or military

commitments; and the third party, more mindful of U.S. reaction, would like to follow an even more cautious approach. Considering all these difficulties, he said, they would supply us whatever they had by way of munitions, arms etc., but he expressed his inability to give us either combat aircraft, aircraft spares, or tanks. I thanked him for his frank expression of views and was a little disappointed, though not surprised, at the Turkish reaction to our predicament. On reflection, I have felt that it would not have been realistic for us to expect more help from Turkey than she gave. She gave generously and kept P.I.A. busy, flying all we could into Pakistan.

At Teheran the Shahinshah received me soon after my arrival. In his letter to the Shah, Ayub Khan had expressed disappointment at Iran's attitude towards the Indo-Pakistan conflict. A meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Iran and Turkey had taken place a few days earlier, at the conclusion of which a communique had been issued. In this the Foreign Ministers, whilst expressing sympathy with Pakistan, had concluded that both countries should accept the United Nations' proposal for a cessation of hostilities. Many in Pakistan felt that we had a right to expect more vigorous diplomatic support from these two countries than this communique indicated.

Our Foreign Office, moreover, had understood from our Ambassador in Turkey that this lukewarm attitude of the Foreign Ministers had been conditioned by the Shahinshah of Iran's insistence that Iran and Turkey must not adopt a partisan attitude in this conflict. Iran, like Turkey, was the recipient of military and economic assistance from the United States, and her ability to stand up to American pressure in such a situation was, to say the least, doubtful. The Foreign Office had concluded that Iran had played a leading role in wording the communique in a manner that put us at some disadvantage in adopting a stronger negotiating posture. Thus Ayub Khan in his letter had expressed disappointment at Iran's role in these talks and had said in plain words that Pakistan had a right to expect a more positive response from Iran in this, our hour of tribulation. The Shah read the letter over twice. His face showed that he was hurt that Ayub Khan should have addressed him in such terms and that Iran's role or motives in these talks should have been suspect. He said that it was a pity that he could not say all he knew about this matter. If he could, Ayub Khan would be satisfied that Iran had not been responsible for the effect that the communique had produced. He showed great concern over the situation and congratulated me on the performance of the Pakistan Air Force. I had

arrived in the midst of their national holidays and we had experienced some difficulty in getting certain military stores that had already been allotted to Pakistan by Iran. I therefore asked if he would order his people to work throughout the holidays to meet our needs. He issued instructions in my presence that all personnel connected with the programme must work night and day to keep the stores moving and that our entire needs in explosives and ammunition were to be met until their own stocks were reduced to zero. He, like Orguplu, did not see his way to giving us fighter aircraft as these were closely watched by the United States Military Assistance staff, but he agreed that we should let them have a list of our requirements in aircraft and equipment. I had brought this with me and handed it over later to Iranian officials.

Having seen the Shah, I returned to Karachi and then to Rawalpindi. In both Turkey and Iran I had been received with sympathy and warmth. It was obvious that the people of Iran and Turkey were greatly disturbed by the situation. It was not unnatural that, notwithstanding the deep brotherly sentiments that existed in both these countries for Pakistan, the Governments of Iran and Turkey did not find it possible to adopt a more positive attitude in this conflict. Both were too deeply involved with the United States and both had a certain

mistrust of the People's Republic of China. They could not, in the face of such conflicting pressures, have been expected to do much more than they did in these troubled times. Since the conflict had been unexpected—at least by our Government—they had not received from us any prior warning of a situation arising which necessitated their active support. Considering the short time that had elapsed since the outbreak of hostilities, their support must be considered speedy and effective. International involvement in such conflict is usually a gradual process. In this case, when the war lasted only 17 days and peace talks and feelers were initiated within the first ten days of the outbreak of hostilities, it would not have been reasonable to expect any serious commitment on the part of Iran or Turkey.

Whilst in Turkey I had heard of the appointment of Ghulam Faruque as Defence Adviser to the President. On my arrival in Rawalpindi a message was awaiting me that he wanted to see me as soon as possible. Having briefed Ayub Khan, the Foreign Minister, and the Foreign Secretary about my mission, I met Ghulam Faruque the same evening. A man of great energy and drive, he appeared excited about his new job. He explained that as Defence Adviser he was required to deal primarily with the procurement of explosives and stores

to keep the armed forces supplied so that the war effort was not interrupted. I had, without being appointed, already begun to perform these functions and had collected an inter-services staff which was by then functioning in the Ministry of Defence. I therefore told Ghulam Faruque that I would be available for advice and assistance, and I briefed him on what had been done so far and what had been planned for the future. The situation was, I felt, satisfactory and although we were running short of stocks in certain types of explosives, I was confident that with the ships that were on the way and the P.I.A. Boeings and Constellations that were bringing equipment and stores, the army would not run out of essential weapons and explosives. I continued to function in this role of a self-appointed coordinator until the war ended, when I returned to Karachi.

His appointment, Ghulam Faruque told me, had been suggested to the President by the Governor of West Pakistan, Nawab Amir Mohammad Khan of Kalabagh and by Air Marshal Nur Khan. Nur Khan had said that Ayub Khan, like Churchill in the Second World War, needed a 'Beaverbrook', and that Ghulam Faruque would be eminently suited to fill this role. Alas, if we also had a Churchill, Pakistan's destiny might indeed have been different today.

Chapter VI

Brigadiers in Command

In Rawalpindi, the control and direction of the war was woefully lacking. At a meeting of the Commanders-in-Chief with the President, some six years earlier, I had suggested that we should give serious thought to higher command and control in war. It was important that we should be clear where the Government would function from during war. Who would direct the national war effort and where would the Commander-in-Chief of the army normally be? This was necessary because the control of modern war is made possible only by a complex communications system. This communications system has to be laid down in peace time and at considerable cost. The staff at a headquarters functions as the extension of a commander's brain, and the brain must have speedy and efficient communication with the limbs or

the formations that a commander controls. These communications between the field formations and the headquarters are not single lines but an intricate network of radio and telephone circuits connecting various people dealing with logistical and operational matters at different places. Similarly, the commanders of the three Services require communications not only between themselves but also with their staffs. The three Service Commanders have also to be connected with the person or persons who control and coordinate the overall war effort. All this should be common knowledge for people possessing even an elementary knowhow of modern warfare. I was, therefore, a little surprised when I was asked why it must be decided in advance where the war would be controlled from. When I explained the requirement, Ayub Khan replied that he would be conducting the war personally from the battlefield. Almost as if to clarify the situation, he added that he would certainly not be in Rawalpindi. General Musa,* always quick to follow Ayub Khan's lead, had added that the only place he was certain not to be in was the General Headquarters (at Rawalpindi) and that he would be in the field, conducting the Corps battle from the Corps Headquarters. These views would have been comic if

* Commander-in-Chief Pakistan Army.

they had not been expressed by people who were responsible for the security of the country. I argued that I thought it most unlikely that the President could remain for long in the field, and that the many calls on his duties would inevitably force him to spend most of his time in the Capital. The coordination of the overall war effort, the hour-to-hour assessment of the military situation, the need to mobilize the nation's resources such as food, rail and road transport, and the need to keep civilian morale at a high pitch were some of the things that would require his presence at the seat of Government. Similarly, I tried to explain that the Commander-in-Chief of the army was responsible for coordinating and directing land operations from Sindh in the south to Baltistan in the north and was also responsible for the situation on land in East Pakistan as well as the entire North West frontier from Chitral to the Baluchistan coast. It was to me inconceivable that he could perform these functions efficiently away from his headquarters. I also did not see the need for him to sit on top of the Corps Commander unless, of course, the Corps Commander was not fit to perform his functions. I was appalled at the complete lack of understanding of this basic problem of control in war.

Twice again I raised this point at the meetings of the

Commanders-in-Chief presided over by Ayub Khan. Although I failed to get my point of view recognised, I proceeded on the assumption that contrary to the direction that I had received the control and direction of war would be from Rawalpindi and that the President would not be in the field. Similarly, I assumed that the Commander-in-Chief of the army would be based for most of the time at his headquarters at Rawalpindi. The Air Force then proceeded to lay all its communications to fit this situation. Since it had been assumed that the President and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army would be in Rawalpindi, it was important that the Air Force Chief should also be there. In war there are numerous calls on the Air Force. It is, therefore, important that the air force Commander should be readily available to advise the Supreme Commander on how the Air Force is being used. If this is not done and this advice is not readily available, the chances are that under the many pressures that are likely to arise, the Air Force will be misused and the air effort wasted. This is the more likely to lead to serious consequences when the air effort available is small. It was thus necessary that the operational element of Air Headquarters should function from Rawalpindi. Suitable arrangements were, therefore, made by the Air Force to make

this possible and an elaborate communications system was set up for this purpose. When the war broke out, the air force, which had its permanent headquarters at Peshawar, was able to function from its operational headquarters at Rawalpindi with ease and efficiency. The communications that had been laid between the operational headquarters of the Pakistan Air Force and its other formations, as well as the other services, had been tested and tried and been brought to a high pitch of efficiency. The speed with which the Pakistan Air Force was able to react to a fast changing situation was due in large measure to this preparatory work in the field of communications.

As I had anticipated, Ayub Khan did not move out of Rawalpindi throughout the seventeen days of war and Musa's travels were restricted largely to his sorties between his house, his office and G.H.Q. Operations Room. The occasional visit to the President's House in Ayub Park was, apart from one visit to a Corps Headquarters, perhaps the nearest he got to the battlefield further east. The war on the ground was run by Brigadiers Gul Hassan and Bilgrami. A Lieutenant-Colonel of the Pakistan Artillery helped these two in directing the effort of the army. Considering the lack of direction from the top, and considering the generally negative

nature of this guidance whenever it was forthcoming, these officers did admirably well. Whatever guidance the army was able to get was largely the result of the initiative shown by these officers who worked under great strain and under frustrating circumstances. They were, however, not alone in this predicament, for this feeling prevailed also in the lower echelons of the army. Ability had not been the yardstick in the selection of commanders and for too long had lip-service and mediocrity been at a premium.

This business of selecting the right type of officers for senior appointments is so vital to a nation's ability to wage war, and so crucial to a nation's security, that I may be permitted a slight digression from the main course of events.

Chapter VII

A Question of Choice

I was fortunate early in my service career to serve under a succession of indifferent commanders—at the flight or squadron commander level. Some did not like flying, others did not possess the ability to lead. With the solitary exception of Mehar Singh,* a pilot of outstanding ability, no one was able to inspire confidence amongst us, the younger officers. Frustration, and a feeling of disgust and amusement were common amongst us. This was replaced by anger when in Burma, in operations against the Japanese during World War II, our squadron began to get a bad name because the Squadron Commander, an R.A.F. Reserve officer, showed himself to be utterly incompetent. This was largely due to the inability of Air Headquarters to choose wisely. Those who take these

* Squadron Leader Mehar Singh of the Indian Air Force (later Air Commodore).

decisions are busy people working under pressure and usually cannot find enough time to devote to this important matter. They tend to rely on the advice of their staff. Such selections are, therefore, usually left to a person who himself has not been selected for any outstanding qualities. Often his qualification is a loss of 'medical category' or unsuitability for command, or 'dependability'—whatever that may mean—and he is usually a negative type of personality. Such people often take the line of least resistance and recommend people who have 'nothing against them'. Time and again I had seen this system work with the inevitable result that the operational efficiency of the air force had been greatly reduced. I had vowed that, should I ever be placed in a position of authority, I would never let this happen. My experience since those early days has confirmed me in this belief.

The Air Force is divided into a number of stations or bases. The personality and qualities of the Station or Base Commander—as he is commonly called—have a profound effect on his command. He, and not the Commander-in-Chief, is the person they see almost daily and he will consciously or subconsciously mould their outlook. I was firmly of the view that the general tone of the service would depend very largely on the selection

of these dozen or so people. After the Station Commanders, or perhaps even more important than them, is the selection of Squadron Commanders. They are the people who command the combat units of the Air Force. Their numbers in a small Air Force are necessarily small and their importance, therefore, all the greater. It is my belief that these few commanders must be above the average in their own spheres. I was prepared to overlook some of their human failings so long as they commanded respect in the air. They must be professionally sound and superior to those whom they are required to lead. No other quality, however great, can compensate for these essential requirements in the eyes of subordinates. Thus I always took care personally to choose suitable people for these few appointments. This inevitably led to some people being superseded. This is always regarded as an unpleasant thing, but so long as it is done in good faith and with complete impartiality, it is surprisingly well received. If no other facts are allowed to influence the choice, and if this is made the general guiding principle in all cases, the service soon begins to accept it as a healthy practice. Obviously, there are always people who are ever ready to sympathise with the person who has been superseded. However, if the person promoted is clearly outstanding, the one who has been bypassed

knows (though he may not admit it) as do the others, that he has been superseded by a person who is professionally his superior. So long as he knows this, and so long as he knows this is always the yardstick, he will seldom complain. If, however, persons who are not professionally competent are promoted out of turn there will naturally be discontentment and dismay.

This need to select able and efficient commanders is a factor of great importance and is, of course, equally true in all the armed forces. Just as the combat effectiveness of an air force is only as good as its Squadron Commanders, the operational effectiveness of the army is no better than its Divisional, Brigade and Battalion Commanders.

This problem has another interesting aspect, a point made earlier in this chapter. If only the top people are well selected, the rest will largely look after itself. If, for example, the Corps Commanders and Divisional Commanders are well selected, then you have a good army. This is how it works. An able commander will not tolerate inefficiency. He will place a premium on those qualities which he values and will take early steps to get rid of incompetent people. He will recognise ability, and in selection his command will soon begin to show the effects of his attitude and personality. But what happens when a commander is incompetent? He would not like

to appear professionally or intellectually inferior to his subordinates. There are numerous occasions in day-to-day contacts, in exercises and in discussions, when superiority of intellect shows up, however much one may try to suppress it. If this happens often and a subordinate appears to others to possess these qualities in greater measure than the Commander, the chances are that the latter will find some excuse to get rid of the bright subordinate so that he may remain the fountain of all wisdom and others may look up to him for guidance. Since the basic intelligence of the subordinate thus removed may be widely recognised, other tendencies which detract from his usefulness to the service are attributed to him. The interesting thing is that the reporting officer will often be sincere in his assessment. To him such an officer may well appear disloyal for not accepting his views, immature for expressing thoughts so different from the ordinary, unreliable because he does not always carry out the instructions as his superiors had wished even though in their execution he may have improved on the concept. He may also be prone to criticism of his superiors, again somewhat natural when those superiors are intellectually and professionally his inferior. Common human weaknesses, such as the effect of flattery on judgement and a faulty notion of loyalty, further

tend to cloud the issue. Notwithstanding this, the ability to choose is, I believe, the most important single quality in a commander so long as human skill and ingenuity determine the course of war.

Chapter VIII

Midstream

I found it difficult to believe that the President, who had always been cautious in his approach to international relations, particularly as they affected our contacts with India, should have agreed to a policy that had the germs of a conflict on a major scale. In the first week of August we read in the newspapers of the incursion of Azad Kashmir volunteers across the cease-fire line into Indian held Kashmir. As these incursions began to increase in intensity it became obvious that a major shift had occurred in our policy towards Kashmir.

Until a few months earlier, Ayub Khan had recoiled whenever a suggestion had been made that we should encourage just such a development and accept the risk that such a move entailed. What had happened to cause this change in his thinking?

Ayub Khan, like most other Pakistanis, had felt exasperated by India's attitude on Kashmir but he, more than the rest of his countrymen, had believed in seeking a peaceful solution to the issue. When his overtures towards India, culminating in his meeting with Pandit Nehru in 1960, produced no results, his sense of frustration increased. During this period of disappointment certain international events had a gradual but nevertheless significant effect on his thinking. The heroic struggle of the Algerian people and the eventual withdrawal of French power from North Africa; the conflict in Viet Nam and Indonesia's confrontation against Malaysia influenced his thinking. The failure of a large power like the United States to win a military victory in Viet Nam, and Indonesia's success in keeping British forces in South-East Asia fully stretched showed the inherent strength of well led national movements against outside forces.

The sharp and successful encounter of the Pakistan Army with Indian Forces in the Rann of Kutch area further reinforced Ayub Khan's rising faith in our inherent strength. The Rann of Kutch operation also did much to bolster Musa's morale and his assessment of the Army's strength rose in proportion to Ayub Khan's increased faith in the military superiority of our forces. The unlimited capacity of some people for flattery

found full play in the wake of successes in the Rann of Kutch operation. Other well-meaning and honest observers were genuinely proud of our Army's performance and they expressed these feelings whenever the opportunity arose. The press also played its part in creating an atmosphere of triumph and invincibility. This would have affected lesser mortals than Musa, who now began to show greater confidence in his own ability and that of the Army to deal with India. Finding the President more receptive to a bolder course in relationship with India, the Foreign Office began to take a tougher line. Senior civil servants supported this line of thought and G.H.Q. was persuaded to produce a plan of action. The task was entrusted to Major-General Akhtar Hussain Malik, the General Officer Commanding No. 12 Division, who was responsible for the defence of Azad Kashmir. A bold and imaginative officer, the plan reflected his outlook and character. Thus was operation 'Gibraltar' born. The President's approval of the plan was acclaimed by top civilian advisers and Musa, seeing which way the President was inclined, lent it his full support against his basic instincts and military judgement.

This decision was based on three important premises. It was assumed that widespread support existed within occupied Kashmir to make such a guerilla campaign a

success. It was also considered unlikely that, as a consequence of this action, India would be inclined to attempt a large-scale military offensive against Azad Kashmir territory. Lastly, the possibility of India crossing the international frontier either in East or West Pakistan was ruled out.

Whereas it was true that widespread goodwill for Pakistan existed in occupied Kashmir, it was unrealistic to expect that this feeling of resentment against India could be mobilised within a very short time and thereby make the execution of large scale operations behind Indian lines possible. The selection of personnel, many of whom knew neither the area nor the language, made the operation in occupied territory a difficult task. The operation was launched as hurriedly as it had been conceived, and it was surprising that with all these drawbacks it was such a success. The stepping up of the tempo, however, was not gradual enough to give it the character of an internal uprising, nor was it controlled sufficiently to keep it within the bounds of Indian political and military acceptability. When the Indians were faced with a rapidly escalating situation, which endangered their position in Kashmir, they were persuaded by the army to retaliate. This they decided to do in an area in Azad Kashmir which would be strategically

important enough to recapture some of the lost prestige that India had suffered and the loss of which would place Pakistan militarily at a disadvantage. The Haji Pir salient, which provided Pakistan with a link between the northern and southern sectors of Azad Kashmir, was a natural region which fitted this pattern. On 24th August the Indians launched a strong attack on Azad Kashmir positions in this area, which were relatively lightly held, and by the 28th they were in control of sufficient territory to cut the shortest line of communication between Muzaffarabad, the capital of Azad Kashmir, and Kotli, a major communication centre in the southern half of Azad Kashmir. The attack on Haji Pir Pass was the first major violation of the cease-fire line by organized military formations in eighteen years and gave a fresh dimension to the conflict. Pakistan was left with little alternative but to retaliate in an area in which the Indians were vulnerable and where a relatively small effort could produce decisive results. The Chamb-Akhnur area, which permitted the use of armour and which would provide a base that could threaten the vital Jammu-Srinagar road communications to the valley, was selected for the purpose. No. 7 Infantry Division, located south of Lahore, was ordered to move to the Chamb area. The attack was, however, to be carried out

initially by a brigade placed under No. 12 Division, commanded by Major-General Akhtar Hussain Malik. The move of No. 7 Division from its concentration area south of Lahore had far reaching consequences and was a decision of great significance. This Division, along with No. 1 Armoured Division, formed our main counter-attack force and thus the main punch of our Army. Its move away from the area of concentration could only mean that the use of this force against India was not considered likely, at least until after No. 7 Division could return to its concentration area.

As formations of No. 12 Division moved swiftly towards Akhnur, India was faced with a difficult military situation. Just as we had not expected an attack on the Haji Pir Pass, the Indians did not expect an attack in such strength in the Chamb-Akhnur Sector. The use of tanks and heavy artillery was, moreover, unprecedented in the Azad Kashmir conflict, and Pakistan's initial successes created considerable panic in Jammu and throughout occupied Kashmir, and shock and surprise in India. The capture of Akhnur by Pakistan would seriously threaten the lines of communication between India and the Kashmir Valley and it could result in the loss of a large portion of the Indian Army in northern and central Kashmir. Its effect on the morale of the Indian Army

could have been catastrophic and the effect on the nation's will to face Pakistan would certainly have suffered a serious blow. The Indians were left with little choice but to remove this threat to the security of their vital strategic areas and, rather than confine the contest to Azad Kashmir, decided to extend the area of conflict to West Pakistan.

Of all the places in West Pakistan, Lahore was the natural choice. An important communications centre and the political and cultural capital of West Pakistan, it has a special place in the hearts and minds of all Pakistanis. A threat to its security could not fail to draw forces to its defence, and this could well remove the threat to Jammu and Akhnur.

It is possible that the Indians started their offensive with this limited objective. They had not, I believe, reckoned on the all-out retaliation that this attack caused. Only thus can their decision not to use their Air Force on 6th September—except to attack a railway train near Wazirabad—be explained. When the attack on Lahore triggered off a full-scale war, their armour, which had already been moved to the Jammu Sialkot area, was launched in what turned out to be their main offensive against Pakistan.

No. 7 Division's move to the Chamb area was

completed on the morning of the 2nd, about thirty six hours after the offensive launched by No. 12 Division. On the same day, Major-General Yahya Khan, the General Officer Commanding No. 7 Division, was given command of this sector and Major-General Akhtar Malik was ordered to return to his earlier location further north. This had a profound effect on the course of operations in this area and on that of the war with India. Akhtar Malik had conceived the general strategy of operations in his area of responsibility, which included the Chamb-Akhnur sector. He had been instrumental in persuading the President to embark on a course of action which had led to this situation and he felt a personal stake in the outcome of this contest. By temperament and outlook, moreover, he was suited to lead an operation that required boldness and vigour. Above all, he was on the move and was making satisfactory progress. Yahya Khan, with part of a force located about two hundred miles away, and had been preparing for months now for a completely different role. His move to the Chamb area involved a major administrative and logistical switch which was completed with speed and with the inevitable problems that attend such unplanned moves of large military formations.

No. 7 Division arrived after two to three days of continuous preparation and movement and made contact with Indian troops on 3rd September. As it joined battle, the General Officer Commanding No. 12 Division was withdrawn to return to his headquarters farther up country in Azad Kashmir. Just as Akhtar Malik resented being removed from the scene of battle at a critical time, Yahya Khan was not enthusiastic about the thought of implementing a plan with which he had not been associated.

The decision to change commanders in the midst of the Chamb battle was as ill-conceived as the decision to withdraw No. 7 Division from the main force farther south in the Punjab. It was clearly based on the assumption that the Indian retaliation to an attack on Akhnur would come in the Azad Kashmir area in the north and not against Pakistan territory in the south. Whatever the political appreciation, to have weakened the main offensive force of the Pakistan army at a time when, to say the least, our relations with India were strained, was a blunder of the first magnitude and to have replaced a successful commander in the midst of battle was also indicative of an unrealistic approach to military problems that has seldom been precedented.

As Pakistan changed horses in mid-stream, India

began to make a last desperate bid to stiffen her crumbling defences in the Akhnur area. The change of formations slowed down our advance sufficiently to allow the Indians time to consolidate their positions, and as they crossed our borders in the Punjab on 6th September, the morale of the Indians in the Chamb-Akhnur sector began to recover.

The *Mujahid* operation inside Kashmir had in the meantime gained momentum. Pakistan's support of the liberation movement rekindled fresh hope amongst the people of occupied Kashmir, and open war with India appeared at last to provide the opportunity for which many had waited for these long years. When the cease-fire came these people, who had sacrificed much and suffered unimaginable hardships, were as bewildered as many others who had willingly taken up arms to uphold what they believed to be a just cause. As the volunteers from Pakistan withdrew, the *Mujahids* were left at the mercy of the Indian Army. Their villages were burnt and their womenfolk abducted, and as they were gradually rounded up they were put to torture and death. Seldom have a valiant people been betrayed in this manner by a nation in whom they had complete trust. This was perhaps the darkest chapter in Pakistan's history and one which patriotic Pakistanis will long remember with a feeling of shame and guilt.

Chapter IX

Uncle Sam at Wagah

When General Ayub Khan began to woo the Americans in the early fifties he found willing listeners. The United States was at a dynamic stage in international relations. Her historical image of a liberal nation, interested primarily in the growth of democracy and the promotion of human freedom, was as yet untarnished by her involvement in Cuba and Viet Nam. The impact of her military power—unparalleled in history and as yet unmatched by the Soviet Union—was being felt throughout the world. Her 'crusade' against communism, personified by the doggedness and personality of John Foster Dulles, had a ring of genuineness that had left a generally favourable impression on nations entering into newly-found freedom. Communism in most

Asian and Middle East countries was relatively unknown, and the United States' sermons to beware of the 'wicked' Russians found willing, if somewhat amused, audiences. China was not as yet regarded as a real threat, though her long-term conflict with the United States' interests had been clearly foreseen by Dulles and the State Department. Such was the scene when Ayub Khan made his visit to Washington. What he saw of their military resources, and his conversation with their political and military leaders, convinced him that Pakistan's destiny was inexorably tied with that of the United States. The threat to Pakistan's security from a hostile India could, he felt, be countered only with the support of a nation possessing vast military and economic resources. The power vacuum in Asia left behind by the British should, he argued, be filled by the United States if stability was to be assured. Although the Americans had their eyes on the Soviet Union and China, they found the logic of Ayub Khan's reasoning difficult to reject. His forthright manner and frank expression of views was in striking contrast to India's middle-of-the-road approach which had begun to exasperate the Americans. Although they knew that Pakistan was obsessed with suspicion of India they hoped that gradually they might succeed in bringing her round to seeing

the wisdom of abandoning her domestic conflict with India and in making her look outwards to what they regarded as the bigger threat to her security. By 1956, when the military assistance programme was launched, the United States had become emotionally involved in the affairs of the subcontinent and in the security of Pakistan. In the decade that followed, the armed forces of Pakistan were equipped with weapons which, in the judgement of the United States, would confer on her the degree of security that was consistent with her geo-political needs. During the first half of this period Pakistan took a prominent place in the forefront of United States' allies. Much to the delight of her ally and benefactor, she appeared ready to leap into the fray at the slightest excuse. Her membership of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (later re-named CENTO) was the natural outcome of a growing association which had been implicit in the type of relationship that had begun to develop.

As Pakistan drew closer to the United States, India drifted further away. Distrustful of Pakistan's motives in acquiring this relationship, and mindful of the need to maintain a military balance of power in her favour, India grew more and more critical of American policies. As the economic strain of supporting her large military

machine increased, so did her anger and resentment against the United States.

By 1960 the Soviet Union had strengthened its industrial base and acquired a military posture that provided an effective deterrent to American military strength. As the Soviet Union's nuclear stockpiles grew, the implications of a nuclear war on the social and economic structure of the United States became increasingly apparent to the American public. The strategic deterrent, which had for over a decade been the backbone of American military strength, began to lose its political value and a realisation began to grow that, much as the deterrent was necessary, its use by either side as a weapon of national policy was completely out of the question. This had its natural effect on military alliances, and SEATO and CENTO, which had never acquired a clear or precise character, began to lose the little effectiveness that the United States' presence had conferred on them. Towards the last few months of President Eisenhower's second administration the shift in American thinking and the State Department's attitude towards these matters had undergone an unmistakable change. Even before the death of John Foster Dulles in 1959, these signs of change in American policy had begun to appear. Neutralism was beginning to become

more respectable in American eyes and the need for military alliances and the wisdom of large scale military assistance programmes was beginning to be questioned.

This shift in American thinking had been welcomed in India, though the military support that Pakistan received continued to be a source of irritation. American policies began to acquire a respectability in Indian eyes that had not been thought possible a few years earlier. With the election of President Kennedy and a change of administration the United States moved closer to India than she had ever been before. Although Pakistan still had many friends in the Pentagon, the State Department began to reflect more and more the changed mood and the pseudo-liberalism which in Pakistan's eyes characterised President Kennedy's three years in office.

The Sino-Indian conflict put a further strain on our relations with the U.S.A. The atmosphere of friendship which had characterised Pakistan's attitude to American problems rapidly gave way to one of distrust and disappointment. The American decision to provide military supplies to India was resented in Pakistan, and it was felt that the United States should have used the opportunity to make a satisfactory solution of the Kashmir dispute a pre-condition of her support to India in the conflict with China. It was also felt that if

military assistance had to be provided, it should have been done only with Pakistan's consent and to the extent that both Pakistan and the United States considered necessary.

Although the aid that India received was not large, it disturbed public opinion in Pakistan and increased the general resentment already prevailing against the United States. The contacts which the United States began to make with the Indian defence services, as the result of the military assistance programme, brought home to the Pentagon the chronic weaknesses in technique and weapons from which the Indian armed forces were suffering. Their natural antipathy towards the Chinese, and their general belief that India's morale and military strength must be restored, strengthened American resolve to assist her, but only within the limits of her national objectives. These restrictions were imposed by American desire to meet Pakistan's legitimate fears and protestations. In the interpretation of these fears there was a wide area of disagreement, but by and large the United States made a genuine effort to remain mindful of Pakistan's views. The military support that India received was, therefore, restricted. But even this relatively reduced military programme had the inevitable result of further upsetting the balance of power in the

subcontinent in India's favour.

The three intervening years between the Sino-Indian and the Indo-Pakistan conflict were perhaps the most difficult in the history of Pakistan-American relations. India's growing military strength and Pakistan's conviction that this strength would sooner or later be used against her, as well as American refusal to be drawn into local quarrels and her anxiety to build up India as a counter to communist China, severely strained the basis on which Pakistan's relationship with the United States had been based. It was only Ayub Khan's personal belief in their soundness and reliability that prevented an open breach and as Pakistan became more and more vocal in her protests, U.S. irritation with Pakistan's policies and views began to grow.

Such was the climate when hostilities started between India and Pakistan in September 1965, and it is against the background of these developments that the United States' role in this strife must be judged. It appears to me inconceivable that India could have crossed the international border at West Pakistan without the Americans having prior information of their intention to do so. An attack on Pakistan across the international frontier had the possibility of the involvement of China on India's northern borders. India's fears of China and her

comparatively recent experience with her would suggest that it would be extremely unwise for her to start an operation which would lead to a repetition of the 1962 debacle unless the United States knew of her intentions. The United States Government was probably persuaded that by swift action, culminating in the fall of Lahore, Pakistan would be taught a lesson which would have a favourable effect on her conduct in international affairs and her general approach towards India and the United States. It could well remove her urge to lean on China and make her look more towards the west for the solution of her economic and political problems.

When the attack on Wagah took place in the early hours of 6th September, the shadow of Uncle Sam stretched long on the Pakistan plain towards Lahore.

Chapter X

Remorse and Regret

By about 17th September, the situation on land had stabilised. Apart from some operations in Azad Kashmir, in the Ferozepur area and the Sind-Jodhpur border the main Indian thrust had been in the Narowal-Sialkot sector. By launching their main offensive in that area the Indians hoped to cut our main lines of communication between Lahore and Rawalpindi, outflank the defences of Lahore, and also provide protection to their vulnerable supply lines between Pathankot and Jammu. Opposite Lahore the Indian advance had been contained about

seven to eight miles from the outskirts of the city but we were not able to regain much of our lost ground. Nor did the Indians have the strength to push further forward. The battle in the Narowal-Sialkot sector developed into a struggle for control of the Narowal-Wazirabad railway line. Partly because of lack of imagination at the top, we had been forced into a defensive posture with the initiative largely with the Indians. In the Sialkot-Narowal area they had one armoured division and three infantry divisions as against the equivalent of one armoured division and one infantry division of ours. They were also numerically superior on other fronts. In war, whether it is in the air, at sea or on land, the only way a numerically inferior force wrests the intiative from a numerically superior enemy is by bold offensive action.

It was inevitable that the personality of the commander should have a profound effect on the course of land operations, and our response reflected his outlook. Because of our lack of resources and numbers, it was tempting to be cautious rather than bold, to be on the defensive rather than take the initiative. This for a weaker force is the road to disaster. That we managed to avoid disaster was a tribute to the fighting qualities of our men and the leadership of our younger officers who showed great

heroism in difficult circumstances. Ferozepur and the Sind-Jodhpur border were areas which did not directly affect the main theatre of operations and they did not receive as much direction from headquarters as was given to commanders in the Lahore and Sialkot areas. This proved to be a blessing because, though outnumbered, they operated with greater freedom, less hampered by attention from the top, and adopted a relatively bold offensive attitude. In the Ferozepur area we had a Brigade against about a Division of Indian infantry, and on the Sind-Jodhpur border two Battalions against two Brigades of the Indians. In both places, the Indians were forced on to the defensive.

The restraint and timidity that was forced on our army ran counter to the natural inclination of our men and the judgement of our commanders in the field. In most cases they were forbidden to take the offensive even if their assessment showed that they could do so with advantage. It is not necessary in war that a commander should have to ask his superiors before he can attack on his own front. Yet this is what was frequently happening. Commanders in the Lahore and Sialkot areas had been told to obtain approval of G.H.Q. before taking offensive action. Such a request would, therefore, emanate from a Company or Battalion Commander,

and by the time it travelled to Brigade, Division and Corps Headquarters, valuable time would be lost. If all these commanders thought that it was a sound idea, it would reach G.H.Q. The usual answer from G.H.Q. would be to wait, or not to attack at all.

The decision to attack is taken by a commander as the result of his assessment of the factors as he sees them. Some of those can be measured, others are based on certain intangibles that only he can judge, such as the behaviour of the enemy, the lay-out of their positions, the terrain, the morale of his men and their mood. These things are difficult to convey to higher Headquarters. In any case, if you are fighting a war, you do not have to ask before you fight. This attitude caused a general paralysis in the field, making the timid commanders more timid and the bold more cautious. I am amazed how, in these circumstances, our army was able to do so well.

Partly because of shortage of infantry but largely because of unimaginative and timid leadership, we were forced to use our armour in an anti-tank role. The battle in the Sialkot-Chawinda area became a slogging match between tank formations. Tank casualties were heavy on both sides and it soon became evident that a stalemate had been reached which only superior generalship could remove. This appeared to be lacking on both sides. The

Indians, though greater in number, were unable to do more than make small and cautious moves to by-pass our defences. In the main, their effort was directed against our primary defensive positions. Their strategy and their determination were not equal to the task, and they were unable to make much headway. The war of mobility appeared to have ended, a period of consolidation had begun.

The launching of our armour in the Khem Karan area was the high spot in Ayub Khan's career. He had expected great things from this move. So unrealistic had been the appreciation, so faulty the timing, and so inadequate the preparation that success in the venture would have been, to say the least, most unlikely. With the failure of this armoured attack his spirits began to flag and as the battle in the Sialkot-Narowal area reached a stalemate, his morale began to suffer. It was obvious that he had begun to reproach himself for having got into such a situation and was harbouring doubts about the chances of a military success. In situations such as this, when the nation watches and waits on every move, action and word of their leader, his attitude was infectious. Defiance and faith sustain a country's will to continue the struggle, while defeatism seriously weakens the will to resist. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the Foreign Minister, Nazir Ahmed,

the Defence Secretary and I made it a point to visit the President every evening when he usually sat on the lawn of his 'blacked-out' house. We tried to paint an encouraging picture of the battle situation and of India's difficulties, while Nazir Ahmed often talked of what Napoleon and Churchill had said and done in similar circumstances. Thus was Ayub Khan's morale sustained for a few days longer than it would otherwise have been. It was clear that it could not go on much longer. After Bhutto's departure for the United Nations, Nazir Ahmed and I kept up this talk and attempted, as best we could, to sustain the President's morale and his will to continue the struggle. Since I had taken upon myself the responsibility for the movement and supply of stores, explosives and weapons from abroad, I assured him that the position was generally satisfactory and that the flow would be maintained. The army would have enough for its needs.

On about 18th September, the President addressed a Press Conference in which he made a very poor showing. His shaky performance gave a clear impression to those who were present—amongst them many foreign correspondents—that he was weakening. The British High Commissioner, Morrice James, had been making frequent appeals to the two countries to agree to a cease-

fire. The President had begun to see him alone, which was rather unusual and indicative of his desire to express views that he did not wish his own advisers to hear. This, and his general attitude and mood, clearly indicated that he was seeking a settlement. Morrice James, an experienced diplomat, had been quick to assess the President's mood and had used the opportunity presented by these solitary interviews to warn him that Pakistan would suffer serious consequences if the war was not stopped immediately. In this testing hour the Service Commanders were of no help. Musa had for years acted as the faithful deputy. His cardinal principle had been to assess the mood and views of his boss and agree with these even before he had fully understood what they were. Realising that the situation was difficult and knowing Ayub Khan's feelings in the matter, he painted the picture Ayub Khan already had before his eyes—a small army, fighting against great odds, short of ammunition, outnumbered and without adequate resources. He maligned the civilian advisers who, he said, had led the President into this situation and he suggested an end to this madness.

Nur Khan was not timid like his army colleagues, but with him other considerations weighed more heavily. The air force had done remarkably well and its

reputation was at its zenith. A prolongation of the war would inevitably result in attrition, and unless losses were replaced a stage would be reached when the air force would perforce be grounded. The Indian Air Force could, he felt, outlast the Pakistan Air Force, by sheer weight of numbers. This would be a sorry postscript to a spectacular performance, and one he naturally did not relish. There was also the very weighty advice of Nur Khan's uncle—Nawab Amir Muhammad Khan of Kalabagh, the Governor of West Pakistan—to whose charm both he and Ayub Khan were susceptible.

Nawab Amir Muhammad Khan was a typical nineteenth century landlord. Feudal in outlook and conservative by temperament, he exercised great influence over Ayub Khan, who regarded him as a practical and down-to-earth person in whose judgement and advice he had implicit faith.

The Nawab saw things from Lahore and to that extent was nearer the battlefield. But he, no more than Ayub Khan, reflected the mood of the people. He saw in the continuation of the struggle the possibility of the crumbling of the social structure of which he was so staunch a pillar. There is no question that his advice was an important factor in deciding the course of events.

At about this time Afghanistan announced mobilisation and recalled military personnel from leave. This was done ostensibly to prepare for any disturbance that might occur during their national elections, but more probably it was a gesture to India to offset, to some extent, the effect of Chinese moves on her northern borders. Afghanistan's relations with India had always been cordial, and her claims on certain portions of our territory were well known. This move by Afghanistan was, therefore, not a surprise. Though coming as it did when the President appeared to be looking for just such an excuse to step up negotiations to end the conflict, it had a significant effect on the situation.

I have often wondered what Afghanistan would have done if the struggle had continued much longer. I believed then, and I still hold the view, that Afghanistan's active intervention was not likely until a complete collapse had occurred in Pakistan and until India had made spectacular advances in the Punjab. It is true that our north-western borders were very lightly held. In that difficult country, however, even lightly equipped forces could have offered effective resistance. Moreover, the Pakistan Air Force could operate even more effectively against Afghanistan than it had against India. But even more relevant than these

military considerations was the general political philosophy of the Afghans and their ethnic and religious ties with Pakistan. It would be difficult for any Afghan government to arouse enough enthusiasm for a war against Pakistan when we were engaged in a war for survival against India. The reaction of the Afghans to the war in Kashmir in 1947, when large numbers of Afghan volunteers came to fight along with Pakistanis in what many considered a holy war against injustice and tyranny, would certainly have been remembered in Kabul. There was also the unknown factor of the Chinese attitude and the very real threat that she posed along frontiers where, barely three years earlier, she had inflicted a military defeat on India, which had shaken the very fabric of Indian society and had almost toppled its Government. Lately, the attitude of the Muslim world, which almost without exception was now giving full and effective diplomatic support to Pakistan, could not be easily ignored. This attitude would have certainly influenced the Afghan people, if not their Government. There must also have been the lurking thought in the Afghan mind—so well trained in international diplomacy—that militant Hinduism was now on the march. If allowed to overrun Pakistan it could not be contained for long on the banks of the Indus. It would be only a

matter of time before Afghanistan would also be threatened. Although Yusuf,* our Ambassador in Kabul, had been assured by the King and the Prime Minister that this mobilisation was not directed against Pakistan and that the Afghans could never stab their Pakistan brethren in the back, Ayub Khan was not convinced of Afghan intentions. Such was the background when I saw Ayub Khan early on the morning of 21st September.

* Lt. General Mohammed Yusuf.

Chapter XI

'We are under Pressure'

Although I entertained little hope of being able to swing him round to my way of thinking, I did want to try. The situation on land and the increasing tempo of peace talks required early and effective treatment. I started by saying that I was concerned with the situation as it was developing. The performance on the ground had not been satisfactory, and I attributed this to poor generalship and, in particular, to the lack of direction the army had received. Ayub Khan asked me to explain what I meant and I went on to say that I was surprised that certain officers had been appointed advisers to corps and certain divisional commanders to guide them in the discharge of their functions. This indicated that the commanders could not be relied upon to conduct the battle. I suggested that if this were so, it was essential that these

commanders be replaced by people—by the advisers if necessary—who could run the show. I also said that he must no doubt know that the army could not do much unless it was led by persons who had the requisite professional qualities. Ayub Khan felt that I did not appreciate the difficulties the army had to face. They had been fighting against heavy odds and had done remarkably well. I tried to explain that I did not in any way underestimate the heroic manner in which the army had fought, but I did feel that given better leadership, they would have done and could still do greater things. Ayub Khan was not convinced and I then switched to the other matter which weighed heavily with me.

I had reason to believe that Ayub Khan was contemplating reaching a settlement on a cease-fire with India and I felt that it would be a mistake if this were done at this stage. I explained that there were three things in our favour which we might never have again. National morale was extremely high and the will to fight so great that the country was prepared to suffer any amount of hardship. The state of national fervour had to be seen to be believed. Its intensity exceeded our expectations and constituted an asset of inestimable value. The Air Force had already won the air battle and had complete mastery of the skies, and the Indian Navy was confined to its

harbours. This situation, when the enemy had both qualitative and quantitative superiority in equipment, had been achieved by training and preparation for almost a decade. I was not certain that this situation would be repeated a second time. Lastly, China had moved her forces to India's borders. I knew of what had transpired before this had become a reality, and the decision of the Chinese could have a profound effect on the course of our struggle. I said that China might not repeat this gesture a second time.

I urged the President that if he believed, as I did, that Indian expansionism must sooner or later only lead to conflict, then this was as good a time to fight as any. I also reminded him of a military truism, that in war the side that shows greater stamina is usually the victor. War is a matter of nerve, and the side that shows greater determination and endurance will usually achieve decisive results. When things do not go well, it is easy to magnify one's own weaknesses because those one knows well. In such circumstances it is well to remember that the enemy has his difficulties too, and that these could be more serious than one's own. I expressed the view that history might well show that in this war, at this point in time, the Indians were in an even more unsatisfactory situation than we were, and that a prolongation of the struggle

might have serious consequences for their over-stretched resources in logistics and communications. I also pointed out that their morale was not as good as ours and that they, rather than we, would benefit militarily from a cease-fire.

Probably because these views were so different from what he had heard from his advisers during the last few days, he appeared to welcome the discussion. He listened to me with patience, but it was clear that his mind was made up. 'We are under pressure' he said repeatedly. Pressure is something that is difficult to define. It is a state of mind. If a person believes that he is under pressure, it is difficult to convince him that he is not. I saw the futility of continuing the discussion and left his office, disappointed but not surprised at the results of my efforts. As if to put a seal on Ayub Khan's rejection of my views, Morrice James was waiting to see him and was ushered in as I left the room.

As the tempo of negotiations increased, the President began to feel the pressure even more. The army, which had been under considerable restraint, was placed under even greater control and what little initiative the commanders had enjoyed was withdrawn. The air force also became a little less active. There appeared to be little purpose in wasting men and material if a cease-fire was

just round the corner. There was widespread disappointment in official circles in Rawalpindi and, as the United Nations met to discuss the matter in New York, those of us who knew the trend of events waited for the announcement that was made by the President on 23rd September. Shortly after Bhutto had announced the acceptance of the terms of the cease-fire in the United Nations, Ayub Khan addressed the nation. Millions of people heard him with surprise and anger. Many in the Armed Forces, who felt that they could have seen this thing through to a successful end, wept as Ayub Khan spoke. They were baffled to know why, when the Indian advance had been arrested, and before we really had an opportunity to retaliate effectively, a cease-fire had been ordered. Why, when the Air Force had gained such decisive success, was the situation not exploited to its logical conclusion?

Ayub Khan gave the answer in his broadcast as best as he could, but it was not convincing. In fairness to him, however, it must be said that in acting as he did, he had nothing but the security of Pakistan in mind and that he saw in the prolongation of the conflict danger to the safety of the country and the well-being of its people. Whether he was right or wrong, time will show. The answer will, I feel, hinge on India's ability to live in peace

and harmony with her neighbours. Should India succeed in showing a change of heart, Ayub Khan's decision will have been vindicated. If, however, a more militant India, increasingly industrialised and better equipped, should embark again on a military adventure against Pakistan, when our economic and military resources are in comparison even less favourable than they were in 1965, my fears will have been justified. The war of September 1965 would then have been only the first round.

Chapter XII

A Visit to Peking

Soon after the end of hostilities the Soviet Union began to take an active interest in reducing tension between India and Pakistan. However, China's relations with the Soviet Union had deteriorated progressively over the past few years and Soviet involvement on the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent was a development which would undoubtedly arouse China's interest, if not resentment.

The warmth of our relations with the People's Republic of China, and the positive support that China had extended to us in our hour of need, made it necessary that we should not accept Soviet involvement in a dispute in this area without first consulting China.

Therefore, when the Shastri-Ayub Khan meeting had been decided upon and the U.S.S.R. had offered to play

host to the two delegations at Tashkent, it was decided that a visit by the President to Peking was called for. It was, however, decided not to publicise the visit. Ghulam Faruque, Bhutto, Nur Khan and myself accompanied Ayub Khan on this visit.

At a luncheon at which President Liu Shao Chi, Premier Chou En Lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi were present, President Liu Shao Chi was critical of the conduct of the war and was so candid in the expression of his views that Chou En Lai was obviously embarrassed. Liu Shao Chi repeatedly emphasized the need to allow an enemy attack to lose its momentum before mounting a counter attack at a place and time of one's own choosing. He was critical of the early counter attack launched by us and repeatedly emphasised the importance of depth in both time as well as space. We were then given an exposition of Chairman Mao's philosophy on the conduct of war. Ayub Khan, who was obviously uncomfortable, listened patiently to Liu Shao Chi's discourse.

At this lunch I sat next to Marshal Chen Yi, the affable and able Foreign Minister of China. When I had asked Bhutto earlier about his massive miscalculation, that our attack across the cease-fire line in Azad Kashmir would not provoke the Indians to retaliate across the

international border, he had told me of his conversation with Chen Yi at Karachi Airport on 1st or 2nd September 1965, when Marshal Chen Yi had stopped briefly at Karachi Airport on his way to Paris. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had met him at Karachi Airport and had asked him whether an offensive across the cease-fire line into Indian occupied territory of Jammu and Kashmir would provoke the Indians to attack across the international border in the Punjab. Marshal Chen Yi had, he said, thought that India would not cross the international border and that Pakistan could safely continue its offensive in the Chamb Jaurian area. Bhutto and Aziz Ahmad had then convinced Ayub Khan that India would not retaliate.

The true nature of the Bhutto-Chen Yi conversation will probably never be known. The report on the meeting which was furnished to Ayub Khan by his Foreign Minister was undoubtedly a factor in Pakistan adopting a more aggressive attitude towards India in the operations across the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir in the crucial days between 1st and 6th September, 1965.

I feel that Chen Yi, who had a deep understanding of international relations and was a friend of Pakistan, could not possibly have expressed the rather naive view that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto attributed to him. Having seen

Bhutto's conduct since, I am of the view that he used his meeting with Marshal Chen Yi at Karachi Airport to persuade Ayub Khan to continue the offensive across the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir.

Bhutto, though he had little understanding of military strategy, was, I feel, fully aware that our continued offensive across the cease-fire line would inevitably lead to a counter-attack by India across the international border. Why then did he deliberately misguide Ayub Khan? I am convinced that he did so in the expectation that Pakistan would suffer a military defeat. This would result in Ayub Khan being ousted and in the confusion that would follow he, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, would be the obvious person to negotiate a settlement with India and then take over as Pakistan's President. In retrospect, his attitude in the days immediately prior to and during the Indo-Pak conflict has convinced me that Bhutto had tried deliberately to create a situation which would bring him to power. What he failed to do in 1965, he succeeded in achieving six years later. Pakistan's military defeat in 1971, when Bhutto was again the Foreign Minister, led to the ousting of Yahya Khan and the rare spectacle of the installation of a civilian Martial Law Administrator as President of a country. That half the country was lost in the process

was not of great consequence to Bhutto.

The conversation between Ayub Khan and the Chinese leaders about the visit to Tashkent did not take place in my presence. However, I understood that the Chinese gave their blessings to this visit, at the same time cautioning Ayub Khan to beware of the Soviet Union's desire to exploit the situation to their advantage. On this visit and in my earlier contacts I had been impressed by the highly civilised manner in which the Chinese conduct their foreign relations. At no time during our contacts with them did they show any resentment at our close relations with the United States or at our membership of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation. At one time when Ayub Khan was somewhat apologetic about our continued membership of SEATO, Chou En Lai had assured him that anything that was in the interest of Pakistan was in the interest of China. He had said that China did not mind Pakistan's membership of SEATO if it suited Pakistan to remain in the alliance. It was just as well, he had said jokingly, for China to have a friend in SEATO. He had also said that since China was not in a position to provide the hardware, it was in Pakistan's interest that it should secure this from the United States.

We returned from Peking reassured about the

abiding friendship of China and impressed with their practical and friendly approach to the problems of this area.

Chapter XIII

Happiness can Kill

The cease-fire of 23rd September left the armies in occupation of a large part of each other's territories. A large number of marine vessels and cargo had been seized, and international and regional flights over each other's territories suspended. Trade was at a stand-still. It was necessary that peace talks should take place and normalcy restored. Rather than hold these talks at a secretarial or ministerial level, it was decided that the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India should meet, and the Russian offer to hold these talks at Tashkent was accepted. Prime Minister Kosygin, at the head of an impressive array of advisers, was present to meet the two delegations when they arrived at Tashkent on the 3rd January 1966, and stayed there throughout the eight days of negotiations.

Once a cease-fire had been agreed, the decision to hold talks was a logical step. The Indians, moreover, were in occupation of territory near Lahore and Sialkot, and although we could show more square miles of territory in our possession, mostly in the Rajasthan desert adjacent to Sind, the psychological effect of having Indians occupying territory in the Lahore and Sialkot areas six to seven miles from the outskirts of the two cities was, to say the least, humiliating. Thus President Ayub went to Tashkent with the resolve that, having agreed to a cease-fire, he must get the Indians to move back to the international border opposite Lahore and Sialkot. He also believed that Soviet involvement in the Indo-Pakistan dispute was beneficial to Pakistan because, in acting as intermediaries, they would be forced to adopt a more neutral role in Indo-Pakistan affairs than they had shown hitherto. He also hoped that the Indian leaders might take the opportunity offered by the Soviet Union's presence to adopt a more reasonable approach to Indo-Pakistan problems, particularly Kashmir.

The Soviets made it clear from the start that they would not take an active part in the talks between the two delegations. Their purpose had been to provide the two leaders with an opportunity to discuss their differences and be available for any advice and assistance that might

be required of them. Most of the talks were therefore held between the two delegations without Soviet participation, either at the summit level or between the Foreign Ministers. They would then separately meet the Soviets, keep them informed of progress and try to persuade them to get the other side to adopt a more reasonable attitude. Pakistan had hoped to use these talks to tackle the fundamental issue which had been responsible for Indo-Pakistan strife since partition. She therefore insisted that the Kashmir problem be discussed. The Indian position was equally inflexible, and they at first refused to discuss this issue. They maintained that their purpose in coming to Tashkent was to discuss the problems which had arisen as a result of the recent war and not to allow Pakistan to use this as an opportunity to reopen an issue which they considered had already been settled. Later, in deference to Soviet wishes, they were persuaded to discuss this problem.

However, it soon became clear in these discussions that the Indians had no intention of changing their basic stand on this issue and a stalemate was soon reached. Since both sides were agreed on the question of withdrawal from each other's territory and exchange of prisoners it appeared that the basic problem created by the war would at least be tackled. After three or four days it

became evident that a longer stay at Tashkent would not alter the situation.

President Ayub Khan was conscious of the effort the Soviet leaders had made in bringing the two sides together. He felt that stubbornness on our part not to meet the Indians half way would embarrass our hosts. The impressive array of Soviet leaders, including Marshal Malinovsky, the Defence Minister, and Marshal Sokolovsky, the Deputy Defence Minister who greeted him on arrival at functions arranged in honour of the two leaders, made him feel increasingly indebted to Premier Kosygin for the efforts he was making to help find a solution to Indo-Pakistan problems. The longer these talks continued the more he felt embarrassed for detaining top Soviet leaders at Tashkent when they were obviously needed for their normal duties at Moscow. The friendliness of the people of Tashkent and the transparent anxiety of our hosts for the success of our talks, further eroded Ayub Khan's resistance. Towards the end of the week he began to find the Indian attitude more reasonable than he had at the commencement of the talks, although their stand had not changed during the intervening period. He became increasingly critical of anyone who suggested a tough line in these negotiations. When further progress appeared unlikely, it was agreed

that a declaration be drafted, and the last few days were spent putting finishing touches to this document which aroused so much comment and controversy in Pakistan.

It was agreed, on Shastri's suggestion, that the Commander-in-Chief of the two armies should meet to discuss details of withdrawal, and Ayub Khan suggested that the other service chiefs might also get together to discuss their mutual problems. The suggestion to exchange prisoners and withdraw troops to the international frontier having been accepted, it was agreed that talks at ministerial level be held soon afterwards to resolve other matters arising out of the conflict.

Agreement was reached on the declaration on 10th January 1966 and this was read out in the presence of a large gathering of international press and television reporters. The atmosphere was dramatic, and made more so by the almost theatrical effect given to the ceremony by the Russians. The reaction and response of the two delegations to the event was written clearly on their faces. The Indians were jubilant and smiling, while the Pakistanis, almost without exception, were sullen and despondent. If the reaction of the two sides was any indication, it appeared that the Tashkent declaration was for Pakistan a statement of surrender. This attitude was, in fact, indicative of the conviction that every Pakistani

had in the righteousness of our cause and the rather naive belief that great nations would use their influence and power on the side of justice and morality in international relations. It appeared that Pakistan, as yet only 17 years old, had still to learn the cold hard realities of international diplomacy. Shastri, beaming and talkative, was the picture of happiness, and the Indians were all over the room shaking any hand that they could grasp. It was as if India had defeated Pakistan at hockey at the Olympics.

At a dinner hosted by Premier Kosygin to the two delegations some three hours later, the same scenes were repeated. Since guests were moving around freely, the Indians were seeking us out and, after a week of rather cold stares and no talk, were taking a lot of trouble to make pleasant and friendly overtures. Soon after dinner, President Ayub Khan, who was engaged in a conversation with Premier Shastri, beckoned me to his side and introduced me to the Indian Premier. He explained that Mr. Shastri was flying next day to Kabul, from where after a day or two he would fly on to Delhi. Since flights of Indian aircraft over Pakistan territory had been suspended he had planned to fly over Iran, around West Pakistan south of the Baluchistan coast to India. Ayub Khan desired that I should make

the necessary arrangements to allow Mr. Shastri's aircraft to fly direct from Kabul to Delhi over West Pakistan, and he asked Mr. Shastri to break his journey at Rawalpindi. The latter said that he would try to do so and was very appreciative of being allowed to fly direct from Kabul to Delhi. Almost throughout the time that Ayub Khan had been talking, Shastri had been shaking me by the hand—a longer and a more vigorous handshake I do not remember. Almost as if to release my hand from his grasp, I said that I would make the necessary arrangements and would send a message to Karachi. Shastri continued talking cheerfully to all around him, and I noted particularly the apparent warmth and affection with which he met members of our delegation who were introduced to him. When he left the party at about 10 p.m. no one had the slightest idea that he had said his last farewell. Our delegation—apart from the President, who was in a separate villa—were lodged in a small hotel, and having returned to it, we retired to bed soon after 11 p.m. At about 1.30 a.m. I was suddenly awakened by a noise, and as I sat up in my bed I found the light on and my bed surrounded by four people—three Russians and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. The Russians were all dressed, while Bhutto was in his night clothes, and it was obvious that he had been awakened too. As I looked at

them, half asleep, one of the Russians, whom I had met during our stay at Tashkent and recognised as the Soviet Ambassador to New Delhi, began to make a speech in Russian. As he spoke, I wondered what it was all about. Whilst the Soviet Ambassador spoke, another person, an interpreter, took notes. As soon as the oration had ended and before the interpreter could speak, Bhutto announced 'Mr. Shastri is dead'. The interpreter then explained that Mr. Shastri had died suddenly, soon after reaching his villa, and it had been decided to fly his body early that morning to New Delhi. They had come to ask me to arrange clearance for the aircraft that was to carry his body, as well as another aircraft to fly direct from Tashkent to New Delhi, over-flying West Pakistan territory.

I spent the next hour or two with the Soviet Ambassador in the hotel reception room trying to contact someone in Pakistan to ensure that the two aircraft be allowed to fly on their unhappy journey to New Delhi. Special telephone circuits had been laid for the duration of the conference between Tashkent and Karachi and Tashkent and New Delhi via Moscow and I eventually got through to the Air Force Station Commander at Chaklala (Rawalpindi). I passed on to him the necessary instructions.

Happiness can Kill

It had been decided that the aircraft carrying Mr. Shastri's remains would leave at 8 a.m. and we were required to be at the airport by 7.30. It was a bitterly cold morning and the temperature was well below freezing. I was amazed that in spite of the early hour and the lack of adequate notice, the streets of Tashkent right up to the airport were lined with silent crowds almost ten deep. Since the time of departure had been advanced after Shastri's death the people must have been informed some time during the early hours of the morning. Ayub Khan was informed about Shastri's death early in the day and, after calling at the late Premier's villa, arrived at the airport to pay his last respects. The arrival of the funeral procession was, however, considerably delayed and it was not until about 10 a.m. that the procession arrived at the airport. After military honours were paid the body was wheeled on a gun-carriage in front of the row of dignitaries and near the steps of the aircraft which was to take it to Delhi.

As the escorts stepped aside, Premier Kosygin and other top Soviet leaders moved forward to carry the coffin up to the aircraft. As he stepped out of the line, Kosygin looked at President Ayub Khan, who was standing by his side. The President moved after him, and as Kosygin put his shoulder under the box which contained Shastri's

remains, Ayub Khan did likewise. So, slowly and in triumph was Lal Bahadur Shastri carried up the steps of the Air India Boeing. At the top of the steps, the coffin was taken inside the cabin by members of the Indian delegation and the crew of the aircraft. It was a touching scene, made more poignant by the dramatic timing of the event. Amongst those who had carried the remains of Mr. Shastri onto the aircraft was Chavan, the Defence Minister of India, who was being mentioned as Shastri's likely successor. As the pall-bearers stood together at the top of the steps for a few seconds, President Ayub Khan moved towards Chavan and, either overcome by emotion or as a deliberate gesture of goodwill, embraced him warmly. Chavan with both arms at his side stood motionless and did not appear to respond. For those of us who saw this pathetic scene, this appeared to be the lowest point in Pakistan's fortune. This unwilling embrace typified the futility of Ayub Khan's hopes of winning over an arrogant India well set on the road to expansionism.

Looking back at Tashkent, I cannot help feeling that its importance was magnified out of all proportion. It was called a triumph as well as a betrayal of national policy. It was criticised by those who opposed the Government and lauded by its supporters. Tashkent was

significant. It was the first occasion when the Soviet Union played an active and perhaps a constructive role in Indo-Pakistan affairs. It was also important in that it marked the beginning of closer Soviet-Pakistan relations which, for reasons of geography alone, are likely to grow to the mutual benefit of both countries. For the future of Indo-Pakistan relations, it had limited value. Tashkent provided an opportunity to normalise relations after the war and return to conditions as they obtained before the conflict started. It also provided an occasion to confirm us in our view that India had not changed her thinking on basic issues and that the road to honour and safety lay only in a strong Pakistan, alive to its responsibilities and aware of the dangers that surround it. Our ability to grasp this will determine the course of events on the subcontinent for the next few decades and will show whether Pakistan can achieve its destiny—a strong and independent State, united in resolve and able to provide the freedom and happiness to all those people whose aspirations and hopes it so strikingly represents.

Appendix I

Defence Problems of Pakistan

A talk at the Institute of Strategic Studies London 6 May, 1965

Every country has its own peculiar problems and often tends to attach greater significance to the threat to its security than others are likely to accept. I am reminded of a conversation I had with the Commander of the Somali Army a few years ago when he visited Pakistan. He had come at a time when we were engaged in border skirmishes with Afghanistan in the Bajaur area of the North West Frontier. Whilst talking to him, in my ignorance I said that I assumed that Somalia had no border problems with its neighbours and that it must be a very happy situation. He was surprised at my remark and was quick to

tell me of their dispute with Ethiopia and of the serious border problem with which they were faced. Ours is, therefore, by no means the only serious problem of defence, but it certainly has a few special features which I shall endeavour to bring out.

There are a few obvious features of our geography which stand out clearly and have some interesting aspects. First, the country is split into two halves separated by some 1,200 miles of foreign and not too friendly territory, through which we are allowed no surface communications. Secondly, two of the largest powers in Asia, i.e. China and India, have common borders with us. To make matters more difficult, the industrial development of Pakistan is not at present in a position to spend as much on its defence as its geography and commitments demand. With this general background, let us look briefly at our problems and our relations with our important neighbours and then examine the task with which our Armed Forces are faced.

In the west, we have a common border with Iran and fortunately we have the most cordial relations with that country. The border has been demarcated and there is no problem of any kind between us. You know that we are, of course, linked with Iran and Turkey in C.E.N.T.O. and twice yearly we have air exercises with them. We

also have frequent study groups and meetings at staff levels between our Armed Forces. We find these contacts professionally useful and hope that they will continue to our mutual advantage.

The situation in regard to Afghanistan is, I regret to say, rather different and our relations with that country have undergone various phases in the last few years. I am glad to say, however, that our relations have improved considerably in the last year or so. Diplomatic relations have been resumed and fresh trade agreements signed between the two countries. The situation is a great deal better now than it was some years ago, and we sincerely hope that our relations will continue to improve. The real problem springs from the demand that the Afghan Government has been making from time to time for some form of independence for the people inhabiting the western territory of West Pakistan. Although the area has not been indicated clearly, it is loosely defined as the territory west of the Indus river. The actual military position in Afghanistan today is that the Afghan Armed Forces are equipped with Russian equipment and their size, both in the air and on the ground, is comparable to that of Pakistan's Armed Forces.

We do not have a direct border with the Soviet Union, but their territory is very close to the northern

part of West Pakistan. Here we are separated by a narrow finger of Afghan territory in the Wakhan area, which separates us from Russia at places by only 10 miles. Our relations with the Soviet Union are satisfactory and there has been an increase in our contacts in the form of trade, etc., in the last few years.

Coming round a little further east we have a common border with China where our border touches that of the Sinkiang Province of Chinese Turkistan. This border has been recently demarcated to our satisfaction, and it is a comforting thought for us to know that we do not have a border problem with this country.

Our relations with Burma, with whom we have a common border in East Pakistan, are also friendly and there is no dispute between us that might create a problem in the future.

The situation in regard to India is, however, different and we have had problems with that country ever since partition took place in 1947. After the Sino-Indian border trouble in 1962, the Indian Army has been expanded considerably and is today almost a million strong, concentrated largely in East Punjab, Kashmir and around East Pakistan. It is true that by their presence in those areas they are near the Chinese border but their location there is also suited for offensive action, at short

notice, against Pakistan. The Indian Army is today approximately three times our size on the ground and the ratio between the Indian Air Force and ours is about 4:1. Any addition to their strength, therefore, is a matter which causes us grave anxiety and which we must counter. Our Western friends usually try to reassure us by saying that the Commonwealth and the United States would not permit Pakistan's territory to be attacked and the aid given to India is not meant for this purpose. Whilst we accept the statement that the military assistance to India is not provided to build up their strength against Pakistan so that it may threaten or occupy Pakistan's territory, it would be too much to expect any Pakistani to believe that the Commonwealth or the United States would effectively ensure Pakistan's security against such an aggression.

There is no instance in recent history of the United States having got involved in a conflict in any area except in military operations against Communist forces, and we cannot frankly see Britain or the United States wanting to get mixed up in such a conflict should it ever start between our two countries. The pattern is all too familiar. Any aggression against our territory is not likely to be preceded by a declaration of war, but would probably be started in what is called 'self-defence'

against some 'aggression' which had, in fact, never taken place. In the confusion that would follow, it would be difficult for a while to determine who was the real aggressor and before that could be established, large portions of our territories might have been occupied. You have just to look at the problems of East Pakistan, surrounded on three sides by Indian territory in which now large military forces are being built up, to realise that these could equally effectively be used against our territory. Against West Pakistan, the Indian threat is to the narrowest portions of our territory, and Lahore, which is the cultural capital of West Pakistan, is only 15 miles from the Indian border. The western part of the Punjab plains is ideal territory for the use of armour. Even if we assume for a moment that it could be quickly established and accepted that India was the aggressor, I do not think that the Commonwealth or the United States would ever start military operations against India and force them out of our territory. The pattern that we have seen in all countries where such operations have taken place is that the main concern of the big powers is somehow to put an end to the shooting war and get the two parties talking. This process of negotiations, as far as they are concerned, need never end, and in fact the United States themselves are still talking in Korea, and

the Indians do not even wish to talk about Kashmir now. No Pakistani, therefore, would ever believe that our security against the Indian threat would lie in any such vague assurances by the Western powers of helping us in such an eventuality, particularly when such help can only be provided by swift military action. An assurance might perhaps appear more effective if an automatic NATO-type guarantee could apply in this case.

It is a great pity that two countries representing one sixth of the world's population, and which could undoubtedly make a contribution towards stability and peace in Asia, should be facing each other in such a hostile manner. They are thus dissipating their resources and energies on a dispute which could be resolved with vision and foresight. So far as we are concerned, this is only possible if the Indians genuinely accept the existence of Pakistan in good faith and if they allow the people of Jammu and Kashmir to decide their own future. This is, and is likely to remain, the cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy. It will be tragic if the Indians cannot see that their own long-term interests are best served by recognising these two simple requirements.

Appendix II

The 1965 Indo-Pakistan War – A Historical Analysis

Translation of a speech in Urdu. Lahore 22 September, 1968

Before the September 1965 War, three wars in the history of this sub-continent especially deserve to be called wars of Islam, in the light of which the Pakistani nation can today analyse its conduct. The first of these was the war of Debul, in which Mohammad bin Qasim's victory enabled the Muslims to gain a firm foothold in Sindh and opened for them ways to advance into the sub-continent. The second was the war of Somnath, in which Mahmud Ghaznavi, by decisively defeating the combined forces of India, paved the way for Muslim conquests during the next 700 years. Both these wars belong to periods when Muslims entered this sub-

continent as conquerors with the resources of mighty kingdoms outside India backing them. Mohammad bin Qasim came to this sub-continent at a time when the flood of Muslim conquests had reached the frontiers of China in the east and Spain in the west. Mahmud Ghaznavi, too, was the ruler of a powerful kingdom outside India. No Asian country could, at that time, have stood up to him. Whenever he attacked India, he had with him soldiers of various nations and races. If Mohammad bin Qasim or Mahmud Ghaznavi ever had to retreat, they could attack again with greater force.

The third one was the third battle of Panipat. This battle was fought when the Moghul empire had declined, the Marathas were dreaming of their hegemony over the sub-continent and Muslims were faced with complete extinction. Ahmad Shah Abdali came to their rescue. By defeating, on the plains of Panipat, the vast Maratha armies, he changed the course of Indian history.

Of the September 1965 war we can say with pride that in it the collective consciousness of the Pakistani nation and the soldierly character of its armed forces were on a par with that which the *Mujahids* of Debul, Somnath and Panipat had shown. I do not mean to say that, judging by its results, this was as decisive as the other

three, or that in this war we inflicted such a crushing defeat upon India that her capacity to wage war in the future was seriously impaired. In fact, this war was neither decisive nor did it result in such heavy losses for India that she cannot replace them. India has considerably augmented her armed might during the three years since. Our military strength, too, is not less than it was three years ago. No, the significance of this war lies elsewhere. First of all, this was a war not only for the preservation of our independence, but for the preservation of our very existence. Pakistan was faced with an enemy who had given ample proof of her bad faith. India had driven away from their hearths and homes over seven million Muslims and pushed them into Pakistan. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims had been murdered in India. Thus it was not difficult for us to visualise our fate in the event of defeat or surrender. There was no power at our back to support us—no Ahmad Shah Abdali to come to our rescue. The Indian aggression threatened not only our independence, but the very existence of 120 million people. The Pakistani nation and the Pakistani armed forces had to prove that they could meet this threat. Allah be praised for our unflinching courage and determination and for our soldiers' reviving the glorious traditions of our ancestors.

Appendix II

There were many in Pakistan who, before this war, were overawed by the material resources and the numerical strength of the armed forces of India, and felt that we, with our limited military resources, could not face such a vast country. Such doubts were entertained not only by certain sections of the public, but by persons in important official positions. I remember that once, when I was seeking an increased budget financial sanction for the Air Force, a highly-placed government functionary told me: 'Your Air Force is very small as compared to the Indian Air Force. Today it is one-fourth of the Indian Air Force. What difference will it make if the proportion is reduced to one-fifth? So why waste our precious financial resources?'

Machines and costly sophisticated weapons are of vital importance in modern warfare. It is not surprising, therefore, that it is widely believed that a bigger and more powerful country can overpower a small country with lesser resources. But the outcome of wars today, as in the past, is largely dependent on courage, faith and military training. To think that the outcome of wars is dependent only on the numerical strength and resources of countries is wrong and dangerous. The September War has conclusively proved that numbers and weapons are not everything; there are other factors which also

matter. I hope that the fear of India's size and resources is now banished for ever from our minds and that our nation, as a result of this experience, better understands its strength.

There is a third reason why this war was so significant for us. This was the first test, after 1947, of the unity between East and West Pakistan and we emerged successful from it. The coming generations will cherish the memory of the high patriotism that our East Pakistani brethren demonstrated during the war. This will deeply influence our nation.

Lastly—and this aspect I regard as the most important—this was a war of independence and survival of a nation which is based on a certain ideology. Pakistan was created in the name of Islam; it can survive only in the name of Islam. The stronger this ideological base, the stronger will be our love for this country; the weaker the base, the weaker will be the nation. It is as vital for us to be alert to safeguard the ideological foundations of Pakistan as to safeguard its geographical frontiers. I will go a step further and say that safeguarding the ideological foundations of Pakistan is our primary duty and responsibility, because a building without sound foundations is bound to collapse.

When we compare the Arab-Israeli war with the

September War, it becomes clear that once the ideological foundation of a nation's unity is damaged, even the bonds of language and race are of no avail. It was Islam which, 1,400 years ago, united the warring Arab tribes, and they conquered most of the known world at the time. But when the bond of Islam among them weakened, the pride of being Arabs could not save them even from a small nation like the Jews. The first mistake that the Arabs committed was that they divided themselves into many parts, and then the machinations of the West enabled the Jews to gain a foothold in Palestine. Their second mistake was that even when Israel had fully prepared itself for aggression—and the Arabs should not have had any doubts about its intentions—they gave up the real foundation of their unity and tried to replace it by new ones.

What followed needs no comment.

An intelligent enemy, before attacking his victim, always tries to find out the secret of his unity and tries to undermine it. Because the secret of our unity and strength lies in acting on Islamic principles, our enemies will always try to weaken the bond of Islam among us, and will lend support to our internal dissensions which can weaken this bond.

The September War united the people of various

parts of Pakistan. We should always be alert to sustain and maintain this unity. We should keep a strict watch on those who attempt to spread regional prejudices. We should not reduce Islam to a mere slogan. Our salvation lies in sincerely acting on Islamic tenets. This is possible only if we have the fear of God in our hearts and a clear conscience—and if selfishness, greed, prejudice and narrow-mindedness do not turn us from the path of justice and virtue.

The September War has provided us with an opportunity to correct our national course. We should remember that if a nation does not learn from its past and is oblivious of its future, nature does not often pardon it. I feel that in the coming years, or possibly in a few months, our faith and our actions will deeply influence the course of the history of this country.

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